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Invoking memories and imagery from the Holocaust 
and other German atrocities during World War II, 
many contemporary commentators and politicians 
believe that the international community has an 
affirmative obligation to deter and incapacitate 
perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities.  Today, the 
received wisdom is that a legalistic approach, which 
combines humanitarian interventions with 
international criminal prosecutions targeting 
perpetrators, will help realize the post-World War II 
vision of making atrocities a crime of the past.  This 
Article argues, in contrast, that humanitarian 
interventions are often likely to create unintended, and 
sometimes perverse, incentives among both the victims 
and perpetrators of atrocities.  The problem is that 
when the international community intervenes in the 
civil wars or insurrections where most humanitarian 
atrocities take place, its decision is partially 
endogenous or interdependent with that of the 
combatants; humanitarian interventions both influence 
and are influenced by the decisions of the victims and 
perpetrators of atrocities. Herein lies the paradox: 
because humanitarian interventions tend to increase 
the chance that rebel or victim group leaders are going 
to achieve their preferred political objectives, such 
leaders might have an incentive to engage in the kinds 
of provocative actions that make atrocities against their 
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followers more likely in the first place.  More 
specifically, the prospect of humanitarian intervention 
often increases the level of uncertainty about the 
distribution of costs and resolve between the 
combatants.  In turn, such uncertainty amplifies the 
possibility of divergent expectations between the 
dominant and rebel group regarding the outcome of a 
civil war.  At bottom, the prospect of humanitarian 
intervention might sometimes increase the risks of 
genocidal violence. This Article turns to insights from 
the domestic framework of  torts and criminal law to 
elaborate upon the theoretical framework that 
motivates this perverse dynamic, provides some 
contemporary illustrations from civil wars in Africa 
and the Balkans, and recommends improvements to the 
current regime to mitigate some of its unintended 
effects.  This Article concludes that the optimal regime 
of humanitarian intervention would incorporate 
comparative fault principles that take into account the 
failure of victim (or rebel) leaders to take adequate 
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 “Never Again.”  This pithy and evocative phrase, which 
conjures up horrific images of the Holocaust and other German 
atrocities during World War II, has long been the rallying call 
for those advocating a more robust international legal regime to 
combat humanitarian atrocities.1  Today, the belief that 
perpetrators of atrocities should no longer be able to hide 
behind the shield of state sovereignty has gained wide 
currency.2  Indeed, an emerging international legal norm of the 
“responsibility to protect” suggests that the international 
community has an affirmative obligation to intervene to 
prevent atrocities in states that are unwilling or unable to do 
so.3  Advocates of such a legalistic approach tend to rely loosely 
                                                 
1 See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http:// 
www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; 
Martin Cook, Ethical and Legal Dimensions of the Bush “Preemption” 
Strategy, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 797, 803 (2005) (“Rallied by the slogan 
“Never Again!”, individual states and the newly created United Nations 
began generation of an entire body of international humanitarian law, 
beginning with The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Genocide Convention, which cumulatively restricted (at least on paper) the 
absolute scope of state sovereignty.”).    
2 See Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the 
Organization, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 
(1991). (“It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference 
with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a 
protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or 
systematically violated with impunity.”); FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 5-12 (1997) 
(summarizing normative arguments for humanitarian intervention); SEAN 
D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN 
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 202-12  (1996) (same); David Scheffer, Towards a 
Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 
258-59 (1992) (providing normative justifications for a collective regime of 
humanitarian intervention).   
3 The Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, P 203, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) 
(discussing the contours of the responsibility to protect) (hereinafter High 
Level Report); The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, Ontario: 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (2001), 
available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, at paras. 
6.36-6.40 (same); see also Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to 
Protect": Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed 
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on analogies between a global regime of humanitarian 
intervention and the domestic framework of torts and criminal 
law, with its attendant objectives of deterrence, incapacitation, 
and the restoration of victims.4  Over the past decade, acts of 
genocide or mass atrocities have fuelled calls for humanitarian 
interventions and/or international criminal prosecutions in the 
Balkans, Rwanda, Burma, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Congo, and Darfur (Sudan).    
 
While the imagery of the Holocaust as a clarion call for 
humanitarian intervention is compelling, this Article argues 
that it has helped spawn an international legal regime that 
might have perverse effects. The problem is that unlike the 
Holocaust, most contemporary atrocities take place in the 
context of full blown civil wars or rebellions in which rebel 
leaders are usually pursuing independent political objectives 
that might be more valuable to them than the lives of their 
followers.  Herein lays the paradox:  because humanitarian 
interventions and prosecutions tend to increase the chance that 
rebel leaders are going to achieve their preferred political 
objectives, they might have an incentive to engage in the kinds 
of provocative actions that make atrocities against their 
followers more likely in the first place.  In other words, by 
                                                                                                                  
Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 716, 723 (2007)  (referring to the 
responsibility to protect as an emerging international legal norm); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes 
of the UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619, 620 (2005) (“[The 2005 High 
Level Panel Report] endorsed the “responsibility to protect”--the idea that 
the international community has a right and a duty to intervene in states 
that cannot or will not protect the human rights of their people against 
“genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations 
of international humanitarian law.”). 
4See High Level Report, supra note ___ at para. 201 (“[T]here is a 
growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary 
responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when 
they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up 
by the wider international community--with it spanning a continuum 
involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding 
shattered societies”); Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to 
Humanitarian Interventions, 9 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1016 n.32 (1998) 
(“[G]eneral considerations of humanity, and possibly even the deterrence of 
acts of internal aggression and repression, are powerful forces behind 
policy-based arguments which suggest the need for an acceptance of some 
form of humanitarian intervention”); See FERNANDO R. TESON, THE LIBERAL 
CASE FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 93-95 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. 
Koehane eds., 2003)  (arguing that the international community’s duty to 
intervene encompasses the obligations to rescue victims from tyranny if 
such intervention can be done at a reasonable cost).    
 4
creating more uncertainty about the distribution of resolve 
and resources among the combatants, a legalistic 
humanitarian intervention approach might perversely spawn 
a vicious cycle of even greater atrocities.  
 
This Article illustrates the perverse logic of humanitarian 
interventions and prosecutions by exploring two contemporary 
cases: Sudan (Darfur) and Kosovo.  While these case studies are 
by no means exhaustive, they are highly representative of the 
kinds of civil wars in which mass atrocities are likely to take 
place.  Together, these case studies reveal a consistent pattern: 
rebel or victim leaders engage in provocative actions against a 
dominant group largely (or partly) because they hope to attract 
humanitarian intervention or prosecution against the dominant 
group, the dominant group responds by aggressively 
committing even more atrocities against the victim group, but 
humanitarian intervention either does not come or comes too 
late to prevent the bulk of the atrocities.  
 
Traditionally, the question of how humanitarian 
interventions affect atrocities has been answered by reference 
to both the motivation of the intervening party and the 
sovereignty costs imposed on the target of intervention.5  Thus, 
much of the legal and philosophical scholarship on 
humanitarian intervention is devoted to institutional design 
mechanisms for screening out pre-textual humanitarian 
interventions from well-motivated ones.6  At bottom, however, 
much of this literature assumes that well-motivated 
humanitarian interventions will have benign effects.  Recently, 
a number of political scientists have begun to question this 
conventional wisdom regarding the interaction between 
humanitarian interventions and mass atrocities.7  In this 
picture, since outside intervention during a humanitarian crisis 
is likely to bias the outcome of dispute in favor of the rebel 
group that is the target of atrocities, some political scientists 
have argued that rebel groups might rationally gamble on 
humanitarian intervention by provoking the dominant group to 
commit atrocities.8  Such accounts often stress the fact that 
humanitarian interventions suffer the same pathologies as 
insurance schemes because they create moral hazard by 
encouraging risk-taking among the intended beneficiaries. 
                                                 
5 See infra Part I. A.  
6 See id.  
7 See infra Part I.B. 
8 See id.  
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But these rational “moral hazard” explanations are 
somewhat incomplete or under-theorized.  For instance, these 
models do not explain why the dominant group and the rebels 
would be incapable of reaching mutually beneficial bargains 
that avoid the costs of genocidal violence in the first place.  
After all, if humanitarian intervention gives an edge to rebel 
groups, we would expect that it would simply increase the 
rebels’ bargaining leverage vis a vis the dominant group 
without necessarily increasing the chance of a war with 
genocidal consequences.  Furthermore, these models often 
assume a seemingly unrealistic empirical picture of rebel 
behavior, which is that rebels are willing to subject themselves 
to genocidal violence in order to increase the chance (perhaps 
marginally) that they will achieve political objectives like 
territorial concession or self-determination. Indeed, one might 
argue that according to the same logic, victims in a domestic 
setting ought to have an incentive to instigate crimes or torts 
against themselves in order to increase the chance that the state 
might prosecute or seek restitution against those who wronged 
them.  Finally, the simple moral hazard story does not account 
for why dominant groups would chose genocidal violence rather 
than a more targeted form of violence to achieve their military 
objectives. 
 
This Article suggests an alternative rationalist 
explanation for why the prospect of humanitarian intervention 
leads to bargaining breakdowns between rebel groups and 
dominant groups that might perversely increase the chance of 
mass atrocities.  First, the prospect of humanitarian 
intervention often increases the level of uncertainty about the 
distribution of costs and resolve between the combatants.  In 
turn, such uncertainty amplifies the possibility of divergent 
expectations between the dominant and rebel group regarding 
the outcome of a civil war.   Moreover, efficient bargaining is 
also hampered because the dominant group cannot credibly 
identify the “true” rebels with whom it should bargain.  Second, 
the basic bargaining model is complicated by the fact that there 
is often a principal-agent problem between rebel leaders and 
non-rebel members of the target group.  Simply put, rebel 
leaders might often engage in high-risk rebellions with remote 
chances of intervention because they reap most of the benefits 
of such interventions while non-rebel members of the target 
group bear the brunt of genocidal reprisals by the dominant 
group.  Third, and finally, a state might choose to engage in an 
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inefficient war against a rebel group in order to signal a 
reputation to future rebels that it is a hard bargainer.  Such a 
dynamic is especially likely when the perpetrator is a regime in 
a weak state that is subject to a high risk of multiple challenges 
by other prospective rebel groups.  Thus, a dynamic that might 
seem inefficient in the short-run might actually be rational 
from a long-run perspective.  
 
One consequence of this framework is that it helps 
resolve the empirical puzzle as to why rebel leaders might 
subject their followers to the risks of genocidal violence just to 
increase probabilistically the chance of achieving certain 
political objectives.  There are three reasons why such a high 
risk strategy might be logical in a humanitarian crisis 
surrounding a civil war but not necessarily in a domestic 
criminal or torts context.  First, in a humanitarian intervention 
regime, the actual victims who have been harmed by a 
campaign of mass atrocities are usually different from the rebel 
leaders who stand to benefit the most from humanitarian 
interventions and international prosecutions.  In the domestic 
corrective justice context, by contrast, there is usually some 
rough symmetry between the individuals injured and the 
individuals who stand to benefit from any compensation 
scheme tailored to address such injuries.9  Second, under the 
domestic torts system, a victim who does not take reasonable 
precautions to prevent an injury to himself might be barred 
from recovery altogether or have his recovery reduced based on 
comparative fault principles.10  But there is no formal 
mechanism for reducing relief to rebel leaders who do not take 
adequate precautions to avoid atrocities in a humanitarian 
intervention and prosecution framework.  Third, and most 
importantly, the ideal of a torts or domestic corrective justice 
framework is to restore the status quo ex ante for the victim, 
but humanitarian interventions and prosecutions generally 
tend to place leaders of rebel groups in a better position than 
the status quo ex ante.11   
 
The motivation of rebel leaders only tells half the story.  
One might wonder why perpetrators from dominant groups 
would allow themselves to be pawns in a strategic ploy by rebel 
leaders to instigate humanitarian interventions.  While 
perpetrating atrocities as a strategy to quell rebellions might 
                                                 
9 See discussion in text at infra notes 26-30.  
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
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not necessarily be optimal, it is hardly irrational.  Leaders of 
dominant groups usually perpetrate such atrocities as a second-
best response to high stakes rebellions; put differently, where 
outright military victory or targeted violence might not be an 
available option against the rebel groups because of resource or 
political constraints, leaders of dominant groups will tend to 
use the threat of indiscriminate violence to coerce the rebel 
leaders to abandon their political demands.     
 
Turning to the normative question, this Article proposes 
a comparative fault approach to humanitarian interventions to 
address the moral hazard problems identified above.  Under 
this approach, the benefits that rebel leaders obtain from 
humanitarian interventions would be reduced when such 
leaders have been found to engage in provocative behavior in 
the wake of a humanitarian crisis. Typically, peace settlements 
negotiated in the wake of humanitarian interventions purport 
to resolve the root causes of civil conflicts by accommodating 
some of the rebels’ political demands.  The problem is that 
when the international community intervenes in a civil war and 
attempts to restructure the domestic political environment by 
forcing or encouraging the combatants to share political power, 
they are usually giving the rebel leaders leverage that they 
would not ordinarily have absent humanitarian intervention.  
And it is this latter factor that partly motivates the perverse 
dynamic that leads rebel leaders to initiate suicidal rebellions in 
the first place.  Alternatively, another strategy is to impose 
lustration policies against rebel leaders who have engaged in 
provocative behavior against dominant groups.  Finally, 
reducing the sanctions faced by perpetrators of atrocities would 
also reduce the intervention benefits enjoyed by rebel groups.  
In sum, this Article concludes that the optimal regime of 
humanitarian intervention and criminal prosecution would be 
less, and not more robust, than the status quo.   
 
This Article proceeds as follows.  The first section of Part 
I explores some of the assumptions about the potential effects 
of humanitarian interventions and prosecutions in the existing 
legal literature and questions some of the comparisons to the 
domestic corrective justice and criminal enforcement regimes.  
By foregrounding some of the differences between a regime of 
humanitarian intervention and prosecution and a domestic 
criminal enforcement or torts regime, this Part suggests that 
the prevailing assumption that greater investment in 
enforcement efforts will necessarily cause a decline in atrocities 
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is both mistaken and unrealistic.  Section B of Part II discusses 
and criticizes the extant political science literature on the 
relationship between humanitarian interventions and mass 
atrocities.  Part II presents a framework that illustrates how 
humanitarian intervention and prosecution is likely to affect the 
behavior of both perpetrators and victims in the context of a 
full-blown civil war or rebellion.  More specifically, this Part 
explores how the decision of the international community often 
interacts with the decisions of perpetrators and victims to 
produce unintended consequences, at least in a significant 
category of civil wars that involve humanitarian atrocities.  Part 
III briefly illustrates this perverse dynamic with case studies 
from Kosovo and Sudan (Darfur).  Parts IV and V build on the 
analysis in Parts II and III to explore some empirical 
implications of the framework and suggest some normative 
recommendations that might mitigate some of the perverse 
effects of a global humanitarian intervention and prosecution 
regime. 
 
One Caveat: while the interaction between humanitarian 
interventions and mass atrocities might be quite complex, this 
Article does not purport to argue that the overall net effects of 
humanitarian interventions are going to be perverse.  Yet, any 
empirical assumption that such effects are likely to be benign is 
also unfounded.  In any event, the more relevant utilitarian 
question is whether we can modify the current humanitarian 




 I. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
Many, if not most, international legal commentators 
believe that “well-motivated” humanitarian interventions and 
international criminal prosecutions will force perpetrators of 
atrocities to internalize the costs of their crimes and make 
victims whole in a similar manner as the domestic corrective 
justice framework of criminal law and torts.  Indeed, to the 
extent that the legal literature concerns itself with possible 
counterproductive effects of interventions, it tends to focus on 
the risks of imposed by third-parties that engage in forceful 
military actions for pre-textual reasons.  Section A suggests that 
the goals and mechanisms of criminal law and bilateral 
corrective justice, which make sense in the domestic realm, do 
not necessarily translate well to the international regime 
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governing humanitarian atrocities  Section B then critically 
examines the political science literature on the relationship 
between mass atrocities and humanitarian interventions.  
 
A. The Legal Conventional Wisdom 
 
 The justifications for the humanitarian and intervention 
regime in the legal literature are deeply wedded to the same 
ideals of bilateral corrective justice and criminal enforcement in 
the domestic legal framework.  Generally, the objectives of 
corrective justice and retribution in a domestic setting are 
accomplished by both criminal law and torts; in this picture, 
criminal law focuses largely on sanctioning perpetrators, 
whereas the torts system focuses largely on compensating 
victims for their injuries and forcing perpetrators to internalize 
the economic costs of their wrongful conduct. Like its domestic 
counterpart, the global regime targeting atrocities assumes that 
there is a clearly delineated perpetrator and a victim who has 
been injured by the perpetrator’s actions.12  Furthermore, the 
global regime assumes that the perpetrator has to be stopped or 
deterred and the victim restored as much as possible.  Based on 
this understanding, proponents of the global justice approach 
believe that the imposition of a more robust humanitarian 
                                                 
12 For instance, the International Commission Report of the 
Responsibility to Protect includes as the goals of humanitarian intervention 
not only prevention of genocides but also rebuilding and restoring the 
victims and reaching a solution to the underlying conflict.  See Report, supra 
note ___ at para. 4.19 (suggesting that military intervention would be 
justified to avert large scale loss of life or large scale ethnic cleansing); see 
also id. at para. 5.1 (discussing the other objectives of rebuilding the society 
and restoring victims); FERNANDO R. TESON, THE LIBERAL CASE, supra note 
____  at 93-95 (focusing on the international community’s responsibility to 
rescue victims from humanitarian harm).  Similarly, the establishment of 
the international criminal court under the Rome Treaty has also been 
justified under deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributivist grounds.  See 
Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 510, 543 (2003) (observing that ICTs combine a retributive and 
deterrent approach); Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, 
and Genocide, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 118-20 (2002) (focusing on 
expressivist rationale for ICTs); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity 
for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (2000) (“The pursuit 
of justice and accountability, it is believed, fulfills fundamental human 
values, helps achieve peace and reconciliation, and contributes to the 
prevention and deterrence of future conflicts.”); David J. Scheffer, War 
Crimes and the Crimes against Humanity, 11 Pace Int’l L Rev 319, 328 
(1999) (“As instruments of deterrence, the tribunals are formidable partners 
that cannot be lightly ignored in the future.”). 
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intervention and prosecution regime that targets perpetrators 
and restores victims will presumably lead to an overall decline 
in the level of humanitarian atrocities.13  Indeed, the emerging 
international legal norm of “the responsibility to protect” 
suggests that states have an affirmative obligation to intervene 
to prevent mass atrocities in other states and help resolve the 
underlying problem which prompted the atrocities in the first 
place.14  Correspondingly, part of the strategy behind 
establishing a permanent international criminal court under 
the Rome Treaty is to institutionalize and depoliticize the global 
enforcement regime in order to better deter future perpetrators 
of atrocities.15   
 
 To be sure, the argument that a more robust 
humanitarian intervention and prosecution regime is an 
appropriate response to atrocities is subject to criticism on 
sovereignty related grounds, including the claim that third 
parties might use intervention and prosecution as a pretext to 
start wars for reasons unrelated to preventing atrocities.16   This 
Article brackets this objection and assumes for now, consistent 
with recent literature supporting humanitarian interventions 
and prosecutions, that a non-pretextual humanitarian and 
prosecution regime is not only feasible, but that greater media 
coverage of wars and recent international legal developments 
                                                 
13 See Bassiouni, supra note ___ at 328.; see also Payam Akhavan, 
Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 16 (2001) (discussing the deterrent effects of 
international tribunals).  The victim-centered perspective looms large in the 
legal literature on humanitarian atrocities.  For instance, some 
commentators have even argued that victims have a right to actively resist 
genocide by military means—a right which the international community 
ought to respect.  See David Kopel, Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right, 
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2006). 
14  See Report, supra note ___at para. 4.19  & para. 5.1.  
15 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of 
Choosing Accountability over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 
192 (2003). 
16 See Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for 
War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 108-09 (2006) (discussing the extensive 
literature that alludes to the dangers of pre-textual humanitarian 
interventions); Thomas Lee, The Augustinian Just War Tradition and the 
Problem of Pretext in Humanitarian Intervention, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
756 (2005) (same); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION 
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 172, 185-86 (2002) (suggesting that 
states could use unilateral humanitarian interventions for self serving 
purposes); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 
144-45 (2d ed. 1979) (“[H]umanitarian intervention can too readily be used 
as the occasion or pretext for aggression.”). 
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have amplified the costs of pretextual interventions.17  Indeed, 
one of the rationales for trying to institutionalize the 
humanitarian intervention regime within the United Nations 
framework is to make sure that the obligation to intervene will 
be implemented consistently and uniformly and not used 
arbitrarily as a political tool to achieve other goals.18  More 
importantly, the possibility that states might act for non-
altruistic reasons should not necessarily disqualify the legality 
of humanitarian interventions, since states that act for selfish 
reasons can presumably produce normatively desirable 
humanitarian outcomes.19  In any event, the segment of the 
legal academy that embraces a more robust regime of 
humanitarian intervention assumes intervention might 
accomplish some of the same goals as a domestic enforcement 
regime; simply put, more enforcement will result in fewer 
atrocities.20  
 
But let us examine closely this analogy between the role 
of the international community in the global intervention 
regime and that of a law-enforcer in a domestic context.  For a 
robust enforcement framework to work it must be able to 
control wrongdoing in some systematic and predictable way. 
Under the domestic criminal enforcement setting, the decision 
and resolve of the state to prosecute a crime is always assumed 
to be a one-sided affair; thus, while the state is supposed to 
influence the perpetrator’s decision to commit crimes or the 
victim’s decision to avoid crimes, neither the perpetrator nor 
the victim is supposed to be capable of influencing the state’s 
decision to prosecute such crimes.21  For instance, the state in 
                                                 
17 See Goodman, supra note___ at 110 (“[T]he very conditions that 
commentators suggest would unleash pretext wars by aggressive states may, 
in general and on average, temper the bellicose behavior of those states.”). 
18 See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, 123-25 (1991). 
19 See Phillip Bobbitt, What’s in it for US, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), 
June 7 2003, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jun/07/usa.comment (“This 
demand - that a state's motives be purely self-sacrificing or are otherwise 
discreditable - reflects expectations that are so unrealistic as to be 
counterproductive to humanitarian goals. Instead, we should be devising 
doctrines . . . that clearly state how the intersection of strategic interests, 
measured on a global scale, with humanitarian interests can move states in 
the right direction”). 
20 See sources cited in infra notes 15-17. 
21 Of course, this assumption is subject to some minor qualifications.  
For instance, some commentators have observed that criminals can invest 
more in anti-detection strategies once the state increases it enforcement 
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the domestic setting does not ordinarily have to consider 
whether a perpetrator will commit more crimes against a victim 
or threaten harm against the state itself in order to persuade 
the state not to prosecute a specific crime.  Nor does the state in 
the domestic law enforcement context ever concern itself with 
the possibility that victims might provoke crimes against 
themselves in order to benefit from prosecutions against a 
perpetrator.  Of course, a victim in a domestic setting might get 
some “vindictive” pleasure from seeing the perpetrator of a 
crime against her punished,22 but there is no reason to assume 
that such benefits will ever outweigh the injuries suffered by the 
victim.  Thus, the risk that a more domestic law enforcement 
framework might create any perverse or unintended 
consequences is trivial, if not non-existent. 
 
The international community’s resolve and decision-
making in a humanitarian intervention and prosecution context 
works somewhat differently.  Unlike a law enforcement agent in 
a domestic setting, the decision of the international community 
or third parties to intervene or prosecute perpetrators of 
atrocities will often be partially endogenous or interdependent; 
in other words, humanitarian interventions and prosecutions 
both influence and are influenced by the decisions of the 
victims and perpetrators of atrocities.  But the problem is that 
the objectives of both the perpetrators and the victims in 
influencing humanitarian interventions are likely to be 
inconsistent with the goals of the international community to 
reduce atrocities.  Thus, the dynamic makes it very difficult in 
many contexts to whether the intervention decision will result 
in a net reduction of atrocities. 
 
To understand how interdependent decision-making in 
the humanitarian context complicates the traditional law 
enforcement model, let us examine how the international 
community’s decision might interact with that of the 
combatants.  Take, the perpetrator, for instance.   The 
international community’s decision to intervene is often a 
function of the international community’s subjective belief 
regarding success and the costs of the intervention,23 but both 
                                                                                                                  
efforts.  See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1331 (2006).  
22 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (Hafner Publ’g Co. 1961) (1781) (“Satisfaction thus 
administered to a party injured . . . may be styled a vindictive satisfaction.”). 
23 Patrick M Regan, Conditions of Successful Third-Party 
Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, 40 J. CONFL. RES. 336, 347-48 (1996) 
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of the factors are influenced directly by the resolve and military 
resources of the perpetrator.24 To complicate the analysis even 
further, rebel leaders also have the ability to influence the 
international community’s decision to intervene.  In the 
political environment governing humanitarian interventions, 
politicians in third-party states might incur significant audience 
costs for seeming too reluctant to use military force to end 
hostilities and resolve the underlying conflict.25  But rebel 
leaders might exploit this dynamic by engaging in provocative 
actions that are more likely to escalate the hostilities and hence 
increase the political demand for intervention by domestic 
audiences in third-party states.  
 
Of course, one might argue that like victims in a 
domestic torts context, the victims of humanitarian atrocities 
already internalize the costs of provocative behavior when they 
face the wrath of dominant groups. But there are three 
fundamental differences between how international 
humanitarian and domestic torts regimes influence the 
incentives of victims.  Collectively, these differences make it 
unlikely that victims in a humanitarian intervention context 
will have similar incentives to victims in a domestic setting to 
take the appropriate precautions to avoid injuries; indeed, these 
differences might create perverse incentives for victims (or 
rebel leaders) in the context of humanitarian crisis to avoid 
such precautions. 
 
First, in the current humanitarian regime governing 
atrocities, there is often a distinction between the individuals 
who have been injured during a humanitarian crisis and the 
individuals who actually reap the windfalls of humanitarian 
interventions and international prosecutions.  In such a regime, 
the primary beneficiaries of humanitarian intervention are 
usually the leaders of the victim groups (or rebel leaders) rather 
                                                                                                                  
(discussing factors that influence successful third party interventions, such 
as the costs of the intervention and the level of casualties); see also PATRICK 
M. REGAN, CIVIL WARS AND FOREIGN POWERS at 45 (“[T]here factors can 
influence the expected utility of intervening: costs, utilities over outcomes, 
and estimates of the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome, all are 
intertwined.”). 
24 CHARLES KUPCHAN, GETTING IN: THE INITIAL STAGE OF MILITARY 
INTERVENTION, IN FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE DYNAMICS OF 
PROTRACTED CONFLICT (Ariel Levite, Bruce Jentleson, and Larry Berman, 
eds. 1991) at 256 (observing that a third party state will only intervene if it 
believes the balance of resolve is in its favor). 
25 Barry M Blechman, The Intervention Dilemma, 18 WASHINGTON 
Q. 63, 64-65 (1995). 
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than the individual victims themselves.  This asymmetric 
remedial scheme is driven by the simple logic that the 
international community cannot realistically negotiate a 
cessation of hostilities with all the victims in a humanitarian 
crisis, and so the international community has to rely on the 
demands of rebel (or victim) leaders as a second-best proxy for 
what the victims want.  In the domestic corrective justice 
context, by contrast, there is usually some rough symmetry 
between the individuals injured and the individuals who stand 
to benefit from any compensation scheme tailored to address 
such injuries.26   
 
Second, the ideal of a torts or domestic corrective justice 
framework is to restore the status quo ex ante for the victim,27 
but humanitarian interventions and prosecutions generally 
tend to place rebel leaders in a better position than the status 
quo ex ante.    Third, under the domestic torts system, a victim 
who does not take reasonable precautions to prevent an injury 
might be barred from recovery altogether or have his recovery 
reduced based on comparative fault principles.28  But there is 
no formal mechanism for reducing relief to rebel leaders who 
do not take adequate precautions to avoid atrocities in a 
humanitarian intervention and prosecution framework.   
  
                                                 
26 Indeed, as indicated by the Second Restatement of Torts, a 
plaintiff must establish the existence of injury, along with the other elements 
of the tort, by a preponderance of the evidence, to qualify for any recovery. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. A (“The word "injury" is used 
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that there has 
been an invasion of a legally protected interest which, if it were the legal 
consequence of a tortuous act, would entitle the person suffering the 
invasion to maintain an action of tort.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  § 
433B cmt. A (observing that plaintiff has to sustain his burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.). 
27 See DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §1.01 (2003) (defining the primary 
purpose of tort damages as an effort to “place the injured party in the same 
position that party would have occupied had the wrong not occurred”); see 
also Moore v. Safeway, Inc., 700 So.2d 831, 858 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1996) (“The 
primary objective of general damages is to restore the party in as near a 
fashion as possible to the state he was in at the time immediately preceding 
the injury.”); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a 
(1977) (noting that compensatory damages are aimed at placing victim in a 
“position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would 
have occupied” absent tort). 
28 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY 
§ 7 (2000) (discussing rule of comparative responsibility).  Almost all 
American jurisdictions now follow the comparative negligence system, either 
through legislation or by judicial adoption. Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 201 (2000).     
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In short, one cannot assume that the victims (or leaders 
of victim groups) in the context of a humanitarian crisis will 
have the same incentives to take precautions against risky 
behavior as victims in a domestic criminal context.  Yet the 
conventional wisdom seems to make this assumption; indeed, 
the rhetoric governing humanitarian interventions and 
international prosecutions seems to cast victims of atrocities as 
mostly harmless and vulnerable individuals who have no hand 
in their misery.29  While in practice many of the members of a 
rebel ethnic group might have played no direct part in an 
unfolding humanitarian crisis, the rebel leaders often do.  But 
rebel leaders do not necessarily seek to maximize what is in 
their followers’ immediate or distant welfare; indeed, like 
politicians elsewhere they might be more interested in securing 
and consolidating political power.  In any event, what is absent 
in much of legal literature governing humanitarian atrocities is 
any theory of what motivates either rebel leaders or the 
perpetrators of atrocities.  In the absence of such a theory, it is 
hard to predict what the effects of humanitarian interventions 
and prosecutions might be on the overall level of atrocities.   
 
B.  The Political Science Literature 
 
In contrast to much of the legal literature and the 
mainstream media, some political scientists paint a much more 
complicated picture of the relationship between humanitarian 
interventions and genocidal violence.  Much of this literature 
assumes, at least implicitly, that perpetrators often act 
rationally when they deploy genocidal violence against their 
less dominant adversaries.30  In other words, rather than acting 
out a fanatical or irrational impulse to harm another ethnic 
group, dominant groups tend to use genocidal violence 
strategically to coerce minority rebel groups to drop their 
military demands.  But deploying genocidal violence also tends 
                                                 
29See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving 
Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 25-26 




30 See Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions: The Causes of Genocide 
and Mass Killings, 9 Security Studies 1 (2000) (discussing the rationality of 
genocidal violence); Stathis Kalyvas, Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of 
Massacres in Algeria, 11 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 243, 245 (1999) 
(“[M]assacres can be understood as part of rational strategy aiming to 
punish and deter civilian defection under specific constraints”).  
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to increase the chance of third-party humanitarian intervention 
against the dominant group.  Thus, the crucial puzzle is why 
certain dominant groups deploy genocidal violence as a tactic, 
and why certain minority groups tend to instigate “suicidal 
rebellions” against their more dominant adversaries. 
 
 In addressing this puzzle, certain political scientists have 
suggested that the role of third parties might explain why 
certain minority groups engage in the kinds of rebellions that 
are likely to spur humanitarian atrocities in the first place.  For 
instance, Alan Kuperman has argued that intervention by the 
international community might unintentionally exacerbate the 
risks of atrocities.31  According to this reasoning, third-party 
intervention in the context of a humanitarian crisis operates 
somewhat like an insurance scheme that protects both rebels 
and other vulnerable individuals from the catastrophic fallout 
of a high risk rebellion.32  Like the role of government insurers 
in guaranteeing financial stability for banks,33 the international 
community (or a third party state) intervenes in part to 
guarantee the stability of the region in conflict and prevent 
massive loss of lives in the wake of a humanitarian crisis.  But 
like all insurance schemes, humanitarian intervention is subject 
to the risk of moral hazard.34  In this framework, one 
consequence of providing such insurance to victim groups (or 
rebel leaders) is that rebel leaders will tend to be less selective 
in the kinds of rebellions they initiate since they might be 
expecting the international community to mitigate the military 
                                                 
31 See Alan Kuperman, Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of 
Humanitarian Intervention, in ALAN KUPERMAN AND TIMOTHY CRAWFORD 
ED., GAMBLING ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: MORAL HAZARD, REBELLION 
AND CIVIL WAR1 (2006) (hereinafter GAMBLING ON HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION). 
32 See id. at 12-16; see also Timothy Crawford, Moral Hazard, 
Intervention, and Internal War: A Conceptual Analysis, in GAMBLING ON 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 26. 
33 See Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. FDIC, 789 F.2d 313, 315 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (“The function of the FDIC is to help maintain the system by 
providing regulatory supervision over banks which it insures and by 
providing deposit insurance on a consistent nationwide basis. In this 
manner, the United States acts through the FDIC to achieve the 
government's goals of providing a safe and sound banking system to foster a 
healthy economic environment”).  
34For a detailed analysis of the moral hazard effect in insurance 
schemes,  see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L 
Rev. 237 (1996).      
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disadvantages of the rebel group relative to the dominant 
group.35   
 
 Although intuitively appealing, the moral hazard 
explanation suffers from many difficulties.  First, genocidal 
violence in the basic framework seems inefficient from a 
rational choice perspective.  If the risk of humanitarian 
intervention favors the rebels in a high-stakes conflict, then it 
should presumably increase the rebels’ bargaining leverage 
without necessarily increasing the chance of genocidal 
violence.36  Since genocidal violence imposes some costs on 
both sides, there should be some peaceful settlement that all 
parties would prefer to war.   For instance, if the expected value 
of intervention increased the chance that the rebels are going to 
achieve their ultimate military objective by 20%, then the 
government should be willing to make more transfers to the 
rebels that reflect the rebels’ increased bargaining leverage.  
Second, these models often assume a seemingly unrealistic 
empirical picture of rebel behavior, which is that rebels are 
willing to subject themselves to genocidal violence in order to 
increase the chance (perhaps marginally) that they will achieve 
political objectives like territorial concessions or self-
determination.  Third, the simple moral hazard story does not 
account for why dominant groups would chose genocidal 
violence rather than a more targeted form of violence to achieve 
their military objectives. 
 
This Article builds on the moral hazard insights of 
Kuperman and others to offer a more general treatment of the 
strategic environment in which bargaining failure between the 
dominant and minority group leads to genocidal violence. By 
focusing on the motivations of the various combatants in a 
                                                 
35 See Kuperman, supra  note __ at 14 (“The international 
community has sought to insure vulnerable groups against the risks of 
genocidal violence by establishing an emerging norm of humanitarian 
military intervention.  In so doing, however, it has inadvertently encouraged 
such groups to engage in the risky behavior of launching rebellions that may 
provoke genocidal retaliation”).  Other scholars have suggested that by 
reducing the costs of coordinating a rebellion, external intervention 
lengthens the duration of civil wars.  See Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas 
Sambanis, External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2433 (2000), available at 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wbkwbrwps/2433.htm 
36 See James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’L 
ORG 379, 380 (1995) (“[W]ar is costly and risky, so rational states should 
have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the 
gamble of war.”) 
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context where they anticipate each other’s responses, this 
Article highlights the information and structural assumptions 
on which the logic of genocidal violence depends.37 
 
II. A THEORY OF COMBATANT BEHAVIOR IN THE 
CONTEXT OF MASS ATROCITIES 
 
This Part tries to sketch out a theory of genocidal violence 
by expanding upon existing explanations why certain groups 
rebel and why dominant groups might resort to mass atrocities 
to quell rebellions.  Section A explores why rebel groups might 
be willing to risk genocidal violence against their followers just 
to increase their chance to achieve political objectives.  More 
specifically, this section suggests that agency problems between 
rebel leaders and their followers might make provocation of the 
dominant groups a rational gamble for rebel leaders, especially 
if they anticipate that the dominant group is likely to respond 
through indiscriminate violence.  This gamble is rational for 
rebel leaders because they stand to reap most of the benefits of 
humanitarian intervention while non-rebel members of the 
target group bear the brunt of genocidal violence.  Section B 
focuses on the factors that hinder mutually beneficial bargains 
between rebels and the dominant group in the shadow of the 
risk of humanitarian intervention. Section C turns to the 
motivations of perpetrators and suggests that perpetrators 
might resort to mass atrocities as a strategy to quell rebellions 
when outright military victory over a rebel group is unlikely 
because of resource and institutional capacity constraints.    
 
A.  Agency Problems and the Strategy of Rebel Leaders 
 
The ideal of a majoritarian theory of political behavior 
assumes that political leaders will be faithful agent of the group 
they purport to represent.38   But any sophisticated analysis of 
the motivations of rebel leaders ought to recognize that the 
behavior of such leaders is likely to be much more complicated 
than any conventional model of political leadership would 
suggest.  As in the cases of Darfur and the Kosovo, the leaders 
of rebellions might be largely quasi-military actors or ethnic 
                                                 
37 See id. at 380 (“A coherent rationalist for war must do more than 
give reasons why armed conflict might appear an attractive option to a 
rational leader under some circumstances---it must show why states are 
unable to locate an alternative outcome that both would prefer to a fight.”) 
38 See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the 
Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 660-62 (1996) (surveying 
rational choice literature discussing what motivates politicians). 
 19
entrepreneurs who have amassed influence and power through 
the force of arms or patronage, but rarely do they come to their 
positions through the ballot box.  In sum, given both the lack of 
clear political accountability or any coherently defined agenda 
by rebel leaders, the possibility of agency drift or slippage 
makes it more difficult to predict whether their actions will 
overlap with a majority of the individuals in any of the groups 
they purport to represent.  
 
At first blush, rebel leaders might seem to have very little 
incentive to put their followers in harm’s way in the context of a 
rebellion against a dominant group.  But if rebel leaders 
rationally believe that humanitarian interventions can alter the 
military disadvantage the rebels face in a dispute against a 
dominant group, they might have an incentive to gamble on 
such intervention even if it comes at the cost of the lives of 
many members of their group.  Indeed, rebel leaders might still 
have an incentive to engage in provocative behavior against the 
dominant group even if they believe the chances of intervention 
are slim, especially if they are gambling on intervention by a 
major power.39   That rebel groups often have to rely on 
intervention by external actors to increase their bargaining 
leverage explains why they might engage in provocative 
behavior that appears otherwise to be of little strategic value.  
But while such provocative behavior might eventually benefit 
the rebel leaders, it is not obvious that it would benefit non-
rebel members of the target group, especially when the 
prospects of obtaining collective goods from the rebellion are 
low.  
 
The crucial insight in this dynamic is that there might be 
significant divergence between the interests of rebel leaders and 
non-rebel members of the target group.  In this picture, the 
rebel leaders might stand to gain a lion’s share of any benefits 
that result from humanitarian intervention while non-rebel 
members of the group tend to bear the brunt of the genocidal 
violence inflicted by the dominant group.40  Since rebel leaders 
                                                 
39 See, e.g, TIMOTHY W. CRAWFORD, PIVOTAL DETERRENCE: THIRD-
PARTY STATECRAFT AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 209 (2003) (“Because the 
benefits of enlisting the United States in a war may be enormous, even the 
slim chance of doing so may goad a party to act provocatively, become 
inflexible in negotiations, or otherwise do things that make wars more 
likely.”). 
40 Indeed, much of literature on the origin of civil wars suggests that 
elite rebel leaders are able to overcome collective action problems because 
they can obtain substantial spoils from fighting such as trafficking in 
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rather than non-rebels pose the greatest threat to the dominant 
group, it makes sense that rebel leaders will oftenleverage their 
threat status to obtain most of the political spoils and monetary 
benefits from a negotiated settlement to the conflict.41  
Moreover, since third-party interveners tend to negotiate 
directly with the rebel leaders rather than other representative 
members of the rebel’s ethnic group, the rebel leaders might 
often attempt to negotiate deals that benefit themselves directly 
rather than the target group at large, such as political offices, 
money, or other substantial government perks.   
 
To be sure, non-rebel members might occasionally 
obtain some benefits from a negotiated peace settlement such 
as increased regional autonomy or self-determination.  In other 
words, not all ethnic disputes will be motivated primarily or 
exclusively by greed or by the private interests of elites within 
the rebel group.  But because non-rebel members are often 
unsure of the threat they face and what options will best protect 
their interests, rebel leaders might find it useful in many 
circumstances to manipulate domestic political sentiments by 
masking private objectives in strong nationalist rhetoric.  
Whether such rhetoric proved to be self-serving is usually not 
evident until after a war has started or has been completed.   
Moreover, even when non-rebels do stand to obtain some 
benefits like territorial concessions, it is not clear that such 
benefits will outweigh the costs of genocidal violence inflicted 
on such non-rebels by the dominant group.   
     
 The question remains: how could the rebel leaders 
maintain support within the target group if they impose such 
costs on non-rebels?  One answer is that non-rebel members of 
the target group might support rebel leaders if they believe 
there is a chance that the rebellion might yield substantial 
                                                                                                                  
contraband and looting.  See Paul Collier and Anne Hoefler, Greed and 
Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Working paper No. 2355 (2000) 
(finding evidence that greed is a better predictor of rebellion than 
grievance); see also Paul Collier, Rebellion as Quasi-Criminal Activity, 44 J 
CONFLICT RES. 839 (2000) (modeling loot-seeking rebellion).   
41 For examples of the kinds of spoils available to rebel leaders in the 
wake of a peace settlement, see generally Bumba Mukherjee, Why Political 
Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some 
Civil Wars, But not Others, 50 INT’L STUD. Q 479 (2006).  For other 
examples that suggests that groups that pose the greatest threat to their 
adversaries get the lion share of the benefits, see Robert A. Pape, The 
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, AMER. POL. SC REV. 2032 (2003) 
(noting that suicide terrorism has been on the increase because terrorists 
have learned that it pays  
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collective goods for the target group, such as greater regional 
autonomy or a greater share of government resources. But if the 
rebellion progresses to a certain stage without any transfers of 
collective goods by the dominant group, then it seems 
reasonable that at some point non-rebel members might 
conclude that the costs of the rebellion are likely to exceed the 
expected benefits.  Thus, a more plausible explanation for non-
rebel acquiescence is that collective action problems will often 
make it difficult for non-rebels to hold rebel leaders 
accountable for their high-risk behavior.  Indeed, the very logic 
that makes rebel leaders overcome collective action problems 
when they engage in provocative behavior against the dominant 
group—the presence of a substantial private good—will often 
makes it difficult for non-rebels to organize against the rebel 
leaders.42 More importantly, non-rebel members of the target 
group are often faced with a Hobbesian choice between 
incurring the wrath of rebel leaders for withholding support or 
otherwise facing the prospect of indiscriminate violence by the 
dominant group.43  Since rebel leaders are likely to have better 
information about non-rebel members who are non-supporters 
than the dominant group, it might be more prudent for non-
rebel members to support the rebel leaders who can then try to 
protect them from the more indiscriminate violence 
perpetrated by the dominant group.44  As some commentators 
have observed, however, many non-rebel members might very 
well choose not to support either side.45  Anecdotally, this 
observation is consistent with reported sentiments of certain 
Darfur residents in the ongoing civil war in Sudan who claim 
that the rebel leaders do not represent their interests.46  
                                                 
42 Collier, Rebellion as Quasi-criminal Activity, supra note __ at 839 
(“One reason why economists are somewhat dismissive of grievance as a 
cause for rebellion is that the provision of justice . . . is a public good and so 
faces acute collective action problems.  However, even when recruits are 
willing to fight for a cause rather than for their own self-interest, predation 
may be the sole means by which a rebellion can sustain itself financially.).  
43 See T. David Mason & Dale E. Krane, The Political Economy of 
Death Squads: Toward a Theory of State-Sanctioned Terror, 33 Int’l Stud. 
Q 175 (1989) (“[A]s the level of repressive violence escalates and becomes 
more indiscriminate, the option of remaining uninvolved is eventually 
precluded because nonelites can no longer assure themselves of immunity 
from political repression by simply remaining inert.”) 
44 See id. at 176 (“Under such conditions, [non-elites] can be 
induced to support rebel organizations by the promise of protection from 
indiscriminate violence by the state.”) 
45 See id. (“[N]on-elites caught in the crossfire between regime and 
rebels would prefer to remain uninvolved, devoting their efforts to the 
everyday tasks of securing subsistence.”). 
46 See infra discussion in text at footnotes___ 
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The approach by rebel leaders relies in part on the logic 
of strategic interaction.  In the language of rational choice, one 
could say the rebel leaders anticipate the likely reactions of 
their more dominant adversaries based upon the available 
information about each other’s resources, capabilities and 
preferences.  In the context of conflict bargaining in a weak 
state where the dominant group lacks both the capability and 
resources to deploy targeted violence effectively, the rebel 
leaders are likely to gamble that the dominant group will resort 
to indiscriminate violence to achieve its objectives.  In this 
picture, the weaker or poorer the state, the more likely it is 
likely to resort to indiscriminate violence to counter challenges 
to its authority.47  Kalyvas is rather explicit on this point: “[T]he 
persistent use of indiscriminate violence points to political 
actors who are fundamentally weak: this is the case with civil 
wars in failed states…, where high levels of violence emerge 
because no actor has the capacity to set up the sort of 
administrative structure required by selective violence.”48   
 
When a dominant group in a weak state is likely to resort 
to a second-best option of indiscriminate violence as a response 
to a rebellion, it gives the rebel leaders an opportunity to exploit 
the fallout of such violence in three ways.  First, the rebel 
leaders will likely gamble that the resultant negative publicity 
from the suffering of their followers will propel domestic 
audiences in the western world to lobby their politicians in 
favor of intervention.  Second, because indiscriminate violence 
is by nature arbitrary and erratic, the rebel leaders can more 
                                                 
47 For an analysis of the relationship between weak states and 
indiscriminate violence, see discussion in infra Part II (C).  Other 
commentators have explained the prevalence of indiscriminate violence in 
weak states as rooted in the state’s inability to engage in more 
accommodative strategies with the opposition.  See, e.g.,  Mason and Krane, 
supra note __ at 184. Indeed, the available empirical work suggests that 
states with weak institutions or poor states account for a significant majority 
of the outbreaks of civil wars.  See Halvard Buhaug, Relative Capability and 
Rebel Objective in Civil War, 43 J Peace Research 691, 695 (2006) 
(“[E]mpirical work has demonstrated that the frequency of domestic unrest 
is inversely related to state strength.  Transitional and institutionally 
inconsistent regimes as well as impoverished countries account for a large 
majority of contemporary civil wars.”)   
 
48 STATHIS N KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENT CIVIL WAR 171 (2006) 
(discussing examples across a wide range of conflicts). 
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easily escape punishment by the dominant group. 49   Indeed, 
one of the ironies of indiscriminate violence is that because it 
targets the “innocent” and the “guilty” alike, it considerably 
reduces the costs of provocative behavior by the “guilty” rebel 
leaders.50   More importantly, because rebel leaders are more 
likely to have access to better information and resources about 
the dominant group’s military strategy than their followers, 
they can take measures that lower their risks of exposure to 
indiscriminate violence. To be sure, if rebel leaders generally 
faced the same risks of reprisals as their followers, they might 
be less sanguine about adopting a provocation strategy against 
the dominant group in the first place.   
 
Third, rebel leaders also tend to exploit the anger from 
reprisals to rally dissenters and otherwise neutral non-rebels in 
the target group to their cause.  In this picture, reprisals might 
drive non-rebels to seek protection from the rebel leaders, even 
when the rebel leaders do not otherwise enjoy significant 
political support among the target group.   The rebel leaders 
also capitalize on the reprisals to isolate and marginalize 
politically moderate voices within the target group, encourage 
recruitment, and raise funds for their violent operations.  For 
instance, one observer points to precisely such an effect in the 
Sudanese government’s brutal tactics against civilians in the 
Darfur region: “To acquaint oneself with the rebels for even a 
few days is to discover the formula for an insurrection: kill a 
boy’s kin, take a man’s cattle, and a rebel is born.”51  In other 
words, the elevated sense of grievance from reprisals 
encourages more people to join the rebellion and helps rebel 
leaders keep their followers committed to a shared sense of 




B. The Structural Factors that Lead to Bargaining 
Breakdowns 
 
                                                 
49 See Mason and Krane, supra note __ at 177 ([M]ost of the victims 
of political violence are found among the non-elite, and their support and 
loyalty are what ultimately determines the outcome of the struggle between 
regime and opposition.”) 
50 See KALYVAS, supra note __ at 154-55.  
51 See Somini Sengupta, Sudan Government’s Attacks Stoke Rebels’ 
Fury, NY TIMES, Sept. 11, 2004, at A1.  
52 See STATHIS N KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENT CIVIL WAR 151-53 
(2006) (discussing examples across a wide range of conflicts).  
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Even if we concede that rebel leaders have a plausible 
reason to 
provoke a dominant group in the context of a high risk 
rebellion, genocidal violence still seems inefficient.  If 
humanitarian intervention merely increases the rebel groups’ 
conflict bargaining leverage, why shouldn’t both parties simply 
reach a settlement that reflects the expected outcome of such an 
intervention?   
 
This Article suggests four reasons why bargaining 
breakdown is likely in the context of a suicidal rebellion that 
spurs genocidal violence.  First, from the perspective of a 
dominant group that worries about developing a reputation 
against downstream rebel groups, the decision to got to war 
might not simply be a zero-sum game.53  Thus, when the 
dominant group (or government) might be confronting other 
potential challengers to its authority in the future, it has an 
incentive to refuse to settle despite the significant costs that 
might be associated with genocidal violence.  In this picture, the 
dominant group has to factor in how any conciliatory gestures 
towards a rebel group might affect the strategic calculus of 
other potential down-stream rebels, especially when the up-
front costs of initiating a rebellion are low.54  If the mere threat 
of violence by a rebel group could easily be used to extract 
concessions from the dominant group, conciliatory gestures by 
the dominant group might actually exacerbate the overall level 
of violence across future periods.  Indeed, similar concerns 
have led some commentators to question the efficacy of 
negotiated settlements for long-term political stability, 
especially in the absence of a clear military victory by either 
side in the dispute.55  In any event, in the context of weak states 
                                                 
53 This insight draws on insights regarding the motivations of repeat 
litigants in the extensive law and economics literature.  See DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE Law 220 (1994)  (observing that parties 
forgo beneficial trades to build credibility in future negotiations); Abhinay 
Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Applications 327-31 (1999) (discussing the 
significant role of reputation on bargaining and illustrating with a simple 
bargaining model); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under 
Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749, 765 (2000) 
(discussing the strategy of reputation-building among individual buyers and 
sellers). 
54In Africa, for instance, one commentator suggested that initiating 
a rebellion is often easier and less costly than opening up a new business.  
See Jeremy M. Weinstein, Africa’s Revolutionary Deficit, FOREIGN POLICY, 
July/August 2007, at 70-71.  
55 See Edward Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 36 
(1999).  
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where most incidents of genocidal violence takes place, the 
authority of the regime is often susceptible to challenges from 
multiple groups.  Thus, the dominant group might likely forego 
a bargaining outcome that might be efficient in the short-run in 
order to send a strong signal of resolve to other potential rebels. 
 
Second, and importantly, there is likely to be asymmetric 
information between the dominant group and the rebel leaders 
as to the identity of rebel leaders who truly pose a threat to the 
dominant group.  Ideally, in the context of a high risk rebellion, 
the dominant group will usually prefer to make concessions to 
only dangerous rebel leaders.  But in the absence of any reliable 
information as who constitutes a truly dangerous rebel leader, 
members of the rebel group will have an incentive to 
misrepresent their level of threat in order to be bribed by the 
dominant group.  As the standard rationalist account of war 
makes clear, bargaining breakdowns are most likely when 
parties have important private information about their level of 
commitment or resolve and have an incentive to misrepresent 
it.56   Thus, the dominant group often has to rely on battlefield 
experience to obtain credible information as to the identity of 
truly dangerous rebel leaders.  In such a situation, it might be 
rational from the dominant group’s perspective to tolerate the 
costs of inflicting a certain amount of genocidal violence rather 
than make inefficient general concessions to both harmless and 
dangerous rebels.   
 
Third, mutually beneficial bargaining might be hindered 
by the reality that some of the stakes in a suicidal rebellion 
might not be divisible.57  Often, rebel leaders might make 
demands for both selfish or targeted goods that benefit the 
rebel leaders exclusively as well as other collective goods that 
benefit the larger target group.  But some of the demanded 
collective goods, such as greater regional autonomy and/or 
territory, are not likely to be easily divisible or monetizable 
from the rebel leaders’ perspective.   For instance,  if territory 
has unique value to both sides in a dispute, the potential for 
bargaining breakdown increases significantly.58     
                                                 
56 See Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, supra note __ at 
390-93. 
57 See Steven Shavell, Suit Versus Settlement When Parties Seek 
Nonmonetary Judgments, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1993) (modeling breakdown 
in negotiations when bargaining involves an indivisible item and 
nonmonetary relief).  
58 See generally MONICA DUFFY TOFT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF ETHNIC 
CONFLICT: IDENTITY, INTEREST, AND THE INDIVISIBILITY OF TERRITORY (2003).  
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Fourth, and most importantly, the prospect of 
humanitarian intervention is likely to introduce a level of 
uncertainty in both the resolve of the combatants and the 
outcome of a conflict that did not exist previously.  In turn, such 
uncertainty increases the chance that both warring parties will 
suffer from information failure or have divergent expectations 
regarding the ultimate outcome of the rebellion. Two 
explanations are frequently offered to explain why rational 
disputants might fail to settle in the face of a mutually 
beneficial bargain: asymmetric information or divergent 
expectations.59  In the “divergent expectations” framework, 
uncertainty arises because both parties make inconsistent 
forecasts about the prospects of victory.  In asymmetric 
information models, one party has private information about a 
crucial factor such as combat readiness or resources, and has an 
incentive to misrepresent such information.  The models have 
been used in both the legal literature on trials and the political 
science literature on warfare to explain how different beliefs in 
ability and/or the cost of litigation influence the option between 
settling a dispute or going to trial/war.   
 
Although the divergent expectations and asymmetric 
information models sometimes yield different empirical 
predictions,60 I rely on both models to capture some of the 
basic intuitions about bargaining breakdown in the wake of an 
expected humanitarian intervention.  The reason for tentatively 
embracing both models is that the goal of this Article is 
significantly less ambitious than presenting an all inclusive 
theory of bargaining breakdown during a civil war.  Rather, the 
aim is to simply reassess how one particular event, 
humanitarian intervention, might play a contributory role in 
bargaining breakdown according to the prevailing models in the 
literature that link uncertainty or inconsistent expectations 
among combatants to the onset of war.  In any event, the 
observation that the role of third parties can exacerbate 
                                                 
59 For a general discussion of these two approaches in the litigation 
context see Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and 
Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J Law & Econ  451 (1998); 
see also Keith Hylton, Assymetric Information and the Selection of Disputes 
for Litigation, 22 J Legal Stud. 187 (1993).  There is a similar divide in the 
literature attempting to explain why wars occur.  Compare James D Fearon, 
Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 Int’l Org 379 (1995) embracing an 
asymmetric information approach) with GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF 
WAR (1988) (adopting an inconsistent expectations approach).   
60 See Walfogel, supra note __ at 452.   
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bargaining dilemmas between combatants is not necessarily 
novel, although the insights have not been applied specifically 
to the humanitarian intervention context.  As David Lake and 
Donald Rothchild have observed with the respect to the role 
played by the assistance by ethnic allies abroad in civil conflicts, 
the involvement of such allies can exacerbate the strategic 
dilemma because “when groups overestimate the support they 
may receive from their ethnic kin, they may become 
intransigent and hold out for a better deal than the other group 
is willing to accept… Likewise, if groups underestimate the 
support their opponents may receive . . . they make too few 
concessions to avert violence.”61 
   
 
The typical story of how war might result in the 
asymmetric information model is that leaders of one group 
might have information about their military resources or 
resolve that their adversaries do not have.  In such a situation, if 
the adversaries believe such leaders have an incentive to 
misrepresent such information, then this dissembling behavior 
could create situations where both parties prefer fighting to a 
negotiated solution.62  In this framework, the risk of 
humanitarian intervention could alter the strategic calculus in 
favor for going to war by increasing the important of private 
information in the bargaining process.   
 
Let us assume, for purposes of argument, that the 
relevant risk of humanitarian intervention is “common 
knowledge” to both parties; in other words, none of the parties 
has greater access to information regarding the probability of 
humanitarian intervention than the other.  In most 
circumstances it is reasonable to think that neither of the 
parties will be really informed about the willingness of the third 
party to intervene in an ongoing crisis.  In the presence of such 
mutual uncertainty about intervention, neither of the 
combatants can predict with confidence the level of assistance 
that the rebels will receive.   For instance, it might be 
unthinkable for the rebels to engage a dominant group if both 
sides know that there is no chance that a third party will 
intervene in the ensuing conflict.  But if both parties are unsure 
                                                 
61 See David A Lake and Donald Rothchild, Spreading Fear: The 
Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict, in David Lake and Donald 
Rothchild ed., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict 30 (1998). 
62 See Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, supra note __ at 
395-96. 
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about the prospects of humanitarian intervention then the risks 
of bargaining failure due to information problems increase, 
especially since neither side is likely to be fully aware of each 
other’s scope of ignorance or beliefs about the risks of 
intervention and both sides have an incentive to misrepresent 
their beliefs.   But even if both parties were somewhat informed 
about the chances of intervention, the possibility of bargaining 
breakdown still remains if the rebels have private information 
about their level of resolve which they cannot communicate 
credibly to the dominant group.  In other words, in the absence 
of common knowledge about rebel willingness to fight, the 
rebels cannot simply announce to the dominant group that the 
presence of humanitarian intervention has significantly 
increased their level of resolve because the dominant group will 
have little reason to believe them.63   
 
Turning to the divergent expectations model, first 
advanced in the legal literature by Priest and Klein, the claims 
is that cases that do not settle will be concentrated among 
disputes close to the decision standard.64  In this picture, a trial 
is more likely where a torfeasor’s conduct was almost negligent 
or a little bit negligent than when the tortfeasor was seriously 
negligent or completely careful.   Why?  Because disputants are 
more likely to make inconsistent judgments about the outcome 
of a dispute that are close to the decision standard where any 
small error in the plaintiff’s judgment will cause her to believe 
that she will win a significant judgment.65  Correspondingly, 
when the outcome of the dispute is close to the standard, a 
small error in the defendant’s judgment will cause her to 
believe she will pay nothing.  However, when the outcome of 
the dispute is far from the decision standard (such as when the 
defendant is terribly negligent), it would then a larger error in 
the disputant’s judgment to make a mistake over the likely 
outcome of the dispute if it were to proceed to trial. 
 
Similarly, in the context of a suicidal rebellion, the 
potential involvement of third parties is likely to alter the 
strategic calculus of the parties in a manner that could lead to a 
bargaining breakdown.  This dynamic could be explained 
                                                 
63 For more detailed analysis as to why combatants might have an 
incentive to misrepresent their level of resolve, see Fearon, Rationalist 
Explanations for War, supra note __ at 395-401. 
64 See George Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes 
for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud. 1 (1984). 
65 See id.  
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intuitively.  For a rebel group to even have a hope of engaging in 
conflict bargaining with the dominant group, its threat to go to 
war has to be credible.  In other words, the expected value of 
the spoils of war to the rebels multiplied by the probability of its 
prevailing against the dominant group has to exceed the 
expected costs to the rebels of prosecuting the conflict.  But in 
the absence of the prospect of third party intervention, the 
“true” likelihood of rebel victory will often be slim if not trivial.  
In this picture, it would require the rebels to make a greater 
error regarding the likely outcome of the war than when there is 
a non-trivial possibility of third-party intervention.  But if the 
rebel threat to go war is not credible, the dominant group is not 
likely to entertain serious conflict bargaining with the rebels at 
all.   
  
A more concrete illustration will help explain this 
dynamic.  Let us imagine that rebels expect to obtain concrete 
benefits worth $1,000,000 from wartime victory and each side 
is likely to incur fighting costs of $200,000.  Assume further 
that the rebel group’s real probability of prevailing without the 
prospect of humanitarian intervention is 0.05.  In this case, for 
the rebels to believe that their threat to go war is even credible, 
they would have to erroneously believe that their chance of 
prevailing is at least 0.2, which is 4 times higher than their real 
chance.  Otherwise, the expected net recovery to the rebel group 
(including costs) would actually be negative [i.e, 
(.05*$1,000,000) - $200,000) and the dominant group would 
have no incentive to make a positive settlement offer to the 
rebels at all.   Thus, the rebel is like the plaintiff in a tort dispute 
in which the defendant has exercised an exceedingly high level 
of care and the litigation costs are fairly high; in such 
circumstances, we would expect incompatible estimates of the 
outcome of the dispute between the combatants to be rare 
because it would require a fairly large error to push the rebels’ 
beliefs over the true outcome threshold.66  In other words, 
given the objective lack of factors in favor of the rebels, the 
chances that both sides are likely to have divergent beliefs 
about what will happen on the battlefield should be small.   
                                                
 
  Let us change the facts a little bit and assume that the 
prospect of third party intervention increases the chance that 
 
66 See Hylton, Asymmetric Information, supra note ___ at 196 (“A 
central proposition of the Priest-Klein model of selection is that disputes in 
which the evidence points strongly toward either innocence or guilt are more 
likely to settle than those in which it does not.”) 
 30
the rebel will prevail against the dominant group to 0.25.  Let 
us further assume that the rebels erroneously believe that their 
chance of prevailing is 0.6, while the dominant group 
erroneously believes that its chance of prevailing is close to 0.1.  
Thus, the rebels will not settle for any amount less than 
$400,000 [i.e. (.6*$1,000,000) – ($200,000)] and the 
dominant group will not be willing to pay the rebels more than 
$300,000 [i.e., (.1*$1,000,000) + ($200,000)].  In this picture, 
there is no longer any prospect for agreement between the 
combatants and so they are likely to go to war.  More 
importantly, however, bargaining breakdown occurs in this 
model even though neither of the combatants’ errors was as far 
from the actual outcome as in the previous example.   
 
To summarize, the Klein-Priest model assumes that that 
the disputants are more likely to have incompatible beliefs 
about the possible outcome of a dispute where the probability 
of liability is most uncertain—i.e., close to 50%.  Building on 
that insight, this section suggests that to the extent that the 
prospect of humanitarian intervention to protect rebels 
introduces a level of uncertainty about the outcome of a conflict 
that previously did not exist, it increases the chance of 
bargaining breakdowns between rebels and dominant groups 
that will lead to civil wars.  Moreover, humanitarian 
intervention might actually make conflict bargaining against 
the dominant group a rational strategy for rebel groups, 
especially when without intervention the rebels’ costs of going 
to war are likely to exceed the rebels’ expected benefits. 
 
 
C. The Motivations of Perpetrators in High Stakes 
Rebellions 
 
An integral piece of this perverse dynamic involves the 
motivations of the perpetrators of the atrocities.  Contrary to 
the received wisdom in the legal academy,67 evidence in the 
political science literature suggests that the leaders of dominant 
groups who engage in humanitarian atrocities are not 
                                                 
67 See MARTHA L. MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: 
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 50 (Beacon Press 
1998) (describing perpetrator’s behavior as irrational); see also Robert D. 
Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits 
of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal 
Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 72 (2007) (suggesting that the same cost-
benefit analysis we make in the domestic sense might not apply and the 
perpetrators might not be rational.). 
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necessarily motivated by irrational or fanatical hatred, but 
rather by a particular logic.  These leaders usually perpetrate 
such atrocities to attain specific political objectives;68 in other 
words, where outright military victory might not be an available 
option against the rebel groups because of resource or political 
constraints, leaders of dominant groups will tend to use the 
threat of mass atrocities to coerce the rebel leaders to abandon 
their political demands.69  As such, the use of mass atrocities 
simply becomes another tool of coercion adopted by dominant 
groups, but it is more likely to be used by dominant groups in 
weak or insecure states that lack the military capabilities to 
force rebel leaders to sue for peace.70   
 
Nonetheless, the behavior of perpetrators in the context of 
high-stakes rebellions is still puzzling, especially when one 
considers that rebel leaders might be gambling on reprisals by 
such perpetrators in order to increase the chance of 
humanitarian interventions.  But why would perpetrators allow 
themselves to be used as pawns in a strategic game by rebel 
leaders?  More importantly, why would they not focus their 
efforts on killing or punishing rebel leaders, rather than 
targeting supposedly innocent and vulnerable members of the 
victim groups?   
  
 Although perpetrating atrocities might not necessarily be 
the optimal approach for quelling high-risk rebellions, it is not 
necessarily irrational.  First, perpetrators might lack the 
resources or ability to engage in selective violence against 
armed rebel groups.  For dominant groups in weak or failed 
states subduing and defeating the rebels by force of arms is not 
                                                 
68 BENJAMIN A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND 
GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 69 (2004) (“My research... also 
suggests that perpetrators may view mass killing as a rational way to counter 
threats or implement certain types of ideologies.”); Helen Fein, Patrons, 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Observations on Bosnia and 
Rwanda, in THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE: RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA 
RECONSIDEREd 5 (Helen Fein ed. 1994) (“Genocide is preventable because it 
is usually a rational act: that is, the perpetrators calculate the likelihood of 
success, given their values and objectives.”). 
69 See Valentino, supra note ___at 69-70. 
70 See Mason & Krane, supra note __ at 184-85.  Indeed, there is a 
growing literature that suggests that state weakness is a large factor in the 
onset of civil wars.  See, e.g., James Fearon and David Laitin, Ethnicity, 
Insurgency and Civil War, 97 AMER POL SC REV 75(2003 (arguing that state 
weakness favors insurgency more than other factors such as ethnic and 
religious characteristics).   
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usually an option.71  In such circumstances, the state or the 
dominant group might likely resort to the blunt and arbitrary 
use of force against civilian populations as a non-ideal strategy 
to motivate the rebels to drop their political demands.  As 
Jeffrey Herbst suggests in his study of African militaries, 
“[a]lthough these blunt strikes usually do not work, they should 
not be seen as irrational given the circumstances African 
leaders face.  Leaders may feel they have no alternative than 
striking out blindly in order to stomp out insurgencies.”72  Of 
course, there is no guarantee that this second-best approach 
will work,73 but such dominant groups usually operate in a 
realm of uncertainty where they cannot usually foresee the 
consequences of various policy alternatives.   
  
Second, even when perpetrators are aware that leaders 
of rebel groups are strategically trying to provoke retaliation, 
they may still consider it rational to retaliate against such 
groups.  In this picture, perpetrators from the dominant group 
are likely to rationally discount the probability that retaliation 
against the rebel groups will provoke a humanitarian 
intervention because such interventions are usually both 
politically and economically costly for the third parties 
involved.74  The perpetrators understand that even when the 
                                                 
71 See Mason and Krane, supra note __ at 177 (“[E]scalating 
repression is perpetrated not because it has a high probability of success but 
because the weakness of the state preclude its resort to less violent 
alternatives”); see also KALYVAS,  supra note __ at 171 (discussing the logic of 
indiscriminate violence among weak states). 
72 See Jeffrey Herbst, African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political 
Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness, 41 J. PEACE RES. 357, 362 
(2004).  
73 In the language of economics, these dominant groups in weak 
states are likely to resort to atrocities against rebel groups as a “second best 
strategy” because the optimal strategy of defeating the rebels militarily 
through selective violence is either too costly or impractical.  See R.G. Lipsey 
& Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 11 (1956).  For a general application of the second-best theory to 
modern day constitutional theory see Adrian Vermeule, Hume's Second-Best 
Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2003). 
74 See De Mesquita & Downs, supra note __ at 630-32 (discussing 
the enormous political costs democratic leaders incur from interventions, 
especially when there is a risk that intervention will fail);  Jack Goldsmith, 
The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 
(2003) (“Nations do not lightly expend national blood and treasure to stop 
human rights abusers in other nations”); David Luban, Intervention and 
Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 
AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL 
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION (de Greiff and Cronin eds. 2002) (observing 
that if the domestic audience subscribes to the belief that only wars in 
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chance of humanitarian intervention is relatively remote, rebel 
leaders might still find it worthwhile to provoke the dominant 
group because the rebel leaders do not fully internalize the risks 
of their provocative behavior since non-rebel members of the 
target group bear the brunt of the violence.  
 
To be sure, deploying selective violence against rebel 
leaders or indiscriminate violence against civilians does not 
exhaust the dominant group’s options for responding to a 
rebellion.   If there is a risk that the use of genocidal violence 
might eventually hurt the dominant group, why wouldn’t the 
dominant group try instead to act in a conciliatory fashion 
towards the rebels by accommodating some of their key 
demands or do nothing?  A fully developed response to this 
question is beyond the scope of this Article.  While admittedly 
speculative, the analysis below suggests two possible 
explanations as to why dominant groups are unable or 
unwilling to ignore rebel provocations. 
 
  First, as mentioned earlier, a conciliatory strategy 
towards the rebels can be problematic from a long run 
perspective, especially when the government (or dominant 
group) might be confronting other potential challengers to its 
authority in the future.  In this picture, the government has to 
factor in how any conciliatory gestures towards a rebel group 
might affect the strategic calculus of other potential down-
stream rebels. Second, and more importantly, the dominant 
group is more likely to incur a greater political cost should it fail 
to respond to rebel provocation than it is from the distant 
possibility of a third party intervening in response to genocidal 
violence.  Simply put, by failing to respond to rebel provocation, 
the leaders of the dominant group risk appearing weak and 
indecisive before a domestic audience, which might in turn spur 
demands for regime change or otherwise embolden the political 
opposition. But if the dominant group has no cost-effective way 
to check the rebels other than by engaging in indiscriminate 
violence, then either by engaging in indiscriminate violence 
against the target group it effectively destroys the base from 
which the rebels draw their support, or it inadvertently 
increases the chance of humanitarian intervention.  And while 
the latter outcome is admittedly undesirable for the dominant 
group, it might often be less costly than allowing the rebels to 
                                                                                                                  
pursuit of national interest should be fought then avoiding any casualties in 
a humanitarian war becomes a priority for elected officials).   
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provoke unchecked and hence increase the chance of 
involuntary regime change.  
 
*    *   *  
 
To summarize, the dilemma imposed by humanitarian 
intervention is that while it imposes a tax on the dominant 
group, it also often provides a subsidy to rebel leaders.  This 
ambiguous incentive structure makes it rational for both rebel 
leaders and the dominant group to act in ways that guarantee 
each a chance at their first best outcomes, and no worse than 
their second-best outcomes, by the rebels instigating and the 
government carrying out genocidal violence, the main costs of 




III. CASE STUDIES FROM THE BALKANS AND AFRICA 
 
This Article explores two brief empirical cases from 
Darfur and Kosovo to illustrate the logic of unintended 
consequences in the context of humanitarian interventions.75 In 
each case, the threat of humanitarian intervention influenced 
the calculus of both rebel leaders and perpetrators in complex 
and unpredictable ways.  More specifically, the threat (or 
prospect) of humanitarian intervention seemed to have 
influenced rebel leaders to escalate provocative behavior 
against a dominant group, even when the provocation would 
likely result in genocidal violence against civilian members of 
the rebel leaders’ group.  
 
Rebel confidence in a provocation strategy was bolstered 
in part because they had recently witnessed other groups who 
had successfully used violence to instigate humanitarian 
intervention or external pressure against the dominant group.  
The decisions to engage in a high-stakes rebellion in both of 
these cases also significantly increased the political stature of 
marginal rebel leaders and spoilers who previously had little or 
no political capital or leverage among the host communities 
                                                 
75 We note that other commentators have suggested a similar 
unintended dynamic in the Bosnian and Rwandan civil wars.  See Alan J 
Kuperman, Provoking Genocide: A Revisited History of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front, 6 J GEN. RES. 61 (2004) (Rwanda); Alan J. Kuperman, 
Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Interventions, 
in GAMBLING ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION at 1 (Timothy J. Crawford & 
Alan J. Kuperman, eds. 2006) (Bosnia and Kosovo). 
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they purported to represent.  Finally, rebel leaders in both of 
these examples seemed to consider provocation a worthwhile 
strategy even if the chances of a humanitarian intervention 
were slim because they bore very few direct risks from any 
reprisals from the dominant group.  Put bluntly, the rebel 
leaders tended to view even low prospects of humanitarian 
intervention optimistically because they rarely internalized the 
full costs of their provocative behavior.   
 
Of course, these two cases are not sufficient to 
demonstrate that humanitarian interventions will invariably 
escalate atrocities.  Instead these cases illustrate that the 
relationship between humanitarian intervention and atrocities 
is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant closer examination by 





At first glance, the Darfur crisis in Sudan seems like a 
puzzling case to illustrate the pitfalls of humanitarian 
intervention.  After all, much of the conventional commentary 
on the crisis assumes that it has been largely ignored by the 
international community;76 indeed, foreign observers and 
NGOs tend to blame the reluctance of western powers to 
intervene for escalating the crisis.77 In reality, however, the 
opposite is true: Darfur’s crisis has been partly exacerbated by 
the level of outside attention it has received over the past four 
years.  While much of that attention has been well-intended and 
has helped publicize the plight of Darfuris to the outside world, 
it might have unintentionally compounded the crisis by fuelling 
intransigence and high-risk provocative behavior on the part of 
Darfur rebel leaders. 
  
A stark illustration of the perverse role of outside 
intervention in the Darfur crisis can be gleaned from multiple 
                                                 
76 See Harold Koh, Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation, 
40 Cornell Int'l L.J. 635. 653 (2007) (“The crisis in Darfur remains an 
international disgrace. The United States sadly has failed to lead the way in 
preventing what Secretary of State Colin Powell forthrightly called a 
“genocide” several years ago.“Never again” should not mean “Never again, 
except in Africa.”); Romeo A. Dallaire, Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda, 
NY Times, October 4, 2004. 
77 See Human Rights Watch, Too Little, Too Late: Sudanese and 
International Response 2004, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/8.htm#_Toc71531709. 
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efforts by the United Nations and the African Union to 
negotiate ceasefires to the conflict.   In a series of rounds of 
peace talks culminating in Abuja, Nigeria in 2006, all but one of 
the rebel groups categorically rejected a peace plan proposed by 
outside mediators, including African Union leaders and US 
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick.78 Surprisingly, the 
Sudanese government agreed to the plan even though it was 
presented by the mediators on a take it or leave it basis in order 
to force the government’s hand.79  The plan would require that 
government disarm all government militias in the region and 
devote millions of dollars in aid to reconstructing Darfur and 
compensating victims of the humanitarian crisis.  Nonetheless, 
two main rebel groups, the Abdul Wahid Faction of the 
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), refused to sign the agreement. The Abuja 
scenario repeated itself again in 2007 when the Libyan 
government hosted another round of peace talks and invited all 
rebel groups, including minor splinter rebel groups to 
participate.80  Once again, the Sudanese government suggested 
its willingness to negotiate,81 but many of the key rebel groups 
did not even bother to show up at the talks.82 
 
But why would the Darfur rebel groups refuse to 
compromise with the Sudanese government even though doing 
so would likely avert further atrocities?  The simple answer is 
that they believed they could profit from holding out.  Even 
though these rebel groups had almost no chance whatsoever of 
prevailing militarily against the Sudanese government, they 
believed that outside humanitarian intervention would 
eventually tip the balance of conflict bargaining in their favor.  
Therefore, they refused to back away from the most strident 
aspects of their negotiating positions even when those demands 
were “unrealistic.”83 As intimated by Abdel Wahid, the leader of 
                                                 
78 See Bashir Adigun, Darfur Rebels Reject Sudan Peace Offer, 
WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A1; see also Alex de Waal, Darfur: The Inside 
Story, THE NEW AFRICAN, April 2007, at 29.  
79 For an in depth discussion of the negotiations, see International 
Crisis Group, Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, Africa Briefing No. 39, 
June 20, 2006, at 2 
80 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rebel Unity is Scarce at the Darfur Talks 
in Libya, NY TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at A1. 
81 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Declares Cease-Fire at Darfur 
Peace Talks, NY TIMES, October 28, 2007, at  __ 
82 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rebel Unity is Scarce at the Darfur Talks 
in Libya, NY TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at A1. 
83 International Crisis Group, Darfur: The Failure to Protect, 
AFRICA REPORT NO. 89 (2005), at 14 (hereinafter “ICG, Darfur: The Failure 
 37
one of the main rebel factions that refused to sign the Abuja 
accord, verbal assurances of implementation of the agreement 
from the United States government were not sufficient: “I want 
a guarantee of implementation like in Bosnia.”84  A 2005 report 
by the International Crisis Group (ICG) supports the notion 
that outside support loomed large as part of the rebels’ strategy: 
“The rebels have equated [international] condemnation of 
Khartoum as support for their cause, and this has hardened 
their negotiating positions.”85  Even Alex De Waal, an adviser to 
the African Union mediation team who is not known to be well-
disposed to the Sudanese government, has conceded that rebel 
leaders like SLA’s Abdul Wahid were hesitating to cooperate in 
negotiations because they were “banking on outside military 
intervention that would drive the Sudanese army from 
Darfur.”86  
 
The Darfur rebel leaders were gambling on a greater role 
by western states because they were first-hand witnesses to a 
recent episode where it seemed to work.  More specifically, they 
had observed closely how overt pressure from the United States 
had led the Sudanese government to make generous 
concessions as part of the 2004 agreement to end the four 
decade old civil war between the Sudanese government and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of southern Sudan.87   
Even though the SPLA had failed to make significant military 
headway against the Sudanese government, the international 
community managed to extract generous commitments from 
the government, including an agreement to set up a separate 
vice president for the south, an oil resource sharing 
arrangement, and an agreement to hold a referendum on 
southern secession in 2011.88  Indeed, many of the demands 
made by the Darfur rebels, such as the demand for a separate 
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vice presidency,89 mirror some of the concessions made by the 
Sudanese government to the SPLA.  The negotiations that led to 
the 2004 North-South agreement, which specifically excluded 
any commitments on Darfur, gave the Darfur rebels reason to 
believe that they could also benefit from western intervention 
(or attention) if they too mounted an offensive rebellion against 
the Sudanese government, despite the obvious military odds 
they were facing.90  In any event, as many experts on the region 
have observed, the North-South conflict and the Darfur 
rebellion are inextricably linked.91  Indeed, the Darfur rebels 
had unsuccessfully attempted to make their demands a part of 
the original north-south negotiation, it was only upon being 
ignored that they resorted to force of arms.92 
 
  At bottom, until the Darfur rebels first launched their 
insurrection against the Sudanese government in two raids in 
February and April of 2003 there was virtually no genocidal 
violence in the region.93  The second raid, which consisted of a 
surprise attack on an airport in El-Fasher, was surprisingly 
ambitious and brazen: the rebels immediately killed thirty 
government soldiers, captured the air base commander, and 
seized some military aircraft.94  According to U.S. government 
sources, they also summarily executed about 200 government 
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soldiers they had captured as prisoners of war.95  To be sure, 
the Darfur rebels had legitimate grievances against the 
Sudanese government, which included long-standing 
government neglect of the region as well as ethnic 
marginalization by the Arab leadership in Khartoum.96  But 
until the negotiations that ended the North-South war, the 
Darfur leaders or officials did not resort to rebellion as a tactic 
to address their grievances and the government rarely adopted 
strong-armed tactics in response.97  Occasional fighting did 
break out between ethnic African and nomadic Arabs over 
grazing rights in the Darfur region, but most of these conflicts 
were contained and occurred sporadically over the 1980s.  Both 
the Arabs and ethnic Africans in the region had managed to 
address their differences without ever resorting to large-scale 
violence.98   
 
Thus, the crucial event that triggered the 2003 
insurrection and the subsequent backlash by the Sudanese 
government was the North-South peace negotiations. Other 
competing theories as to why the Darfur rebels launched their 
rebellion fall short: for instance, articulated grievances about 
ethnic marginalization were longstanding but were hardly 
increasing; indeed, from the early independence period until 
the unexpected airport ambush by rebels in 2003, the Sudanese 
government approach to the Darfur region was one of benign 
neglect.  At the time the North-South peace agreement was 
being negotiated, none of the participants, including the outside 
mediators, thought the problems in the Darfur region were 
significant enough to be addressed as part of the agreement.99  
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 Eventually the Darfur rebel leaders’ strategy did attract 
significant outside attention, especially by the western media 
and governments, but not quite the military intervention that 
that they hoped.  However, it is premature to suggest that the 
rebel leaders’ approach was a strategic failure.  Commentators 
like Alex De Waal are correct to suggest that rebel leaders like 
Abdul Wahid are misguided because none of the major powers 
are ever likely to have the appetite for the kind of large scale 
military intervention they are expecting.100  Instead, the rebels’ 
tactics have largely alienated many of the western powers they 
are seeking to court.   As one State Department official put it:   
 
The first notion anyone's got to disabuse themselves of is 
that there are any good guys in this. There aren't. The 
S.L.A. started this war, and now they and the Justice and 
Equality Movement are doing everything possible to 
keep it going. . .  [T]hey've been very content to sit back, 
let the village burnings go on, let the killing go on, 
because the more international pressure that's brought 
to bear on Khartoum, the stronger their position 
grows.101 
 
Ironically, however, while the Darfur rebel leaders are not likely 
to achieve their preferred objective of western military 
intervention, they have nonetheless improved their status as 
political actors. When measured against the pre-rebellion 
baseline, the rebel leaders are better poised to obtain political 
spoils that would have been unlikely absent the current 
international attention the crisis is receiving.  
 
The rebel leaders have already benefited significantly on 
one front.  The international focus on the Darfur crisis has 
helped catapult many of the rebel leaders into important 
political brokers even though it is not clear that their rebel 
activities were supported by the populations they purport to 
represent.  Indeed, the government has already offered targeted 
benefits to certain rebel leaders to encourage them to lay down 
their arms, including high political positions and cars.102  But as 
one commentator observed from field research conducted a 
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year after the war started:  “Most of the Darfur people 
interviewed for this research…--and most of them supportive of 
the rebels agenda for change--stated both their opposition to 
armed rebellion, and their belief that the current violence 
escalated in response to the insurgency.”103   Certain rebel 
leaders who have profited from the crisis do not even purport to 
represent any of the significantly large ethnic groups in the 
Darfur region.104  More importantly, during a recent visit to the 
region by US officials involved in mediating the conflict, various 
non-governmental organizations and community groups in 
Darfur publicly expressed concerns that these rebel leaders do 
not act in their interests.105  Because of such agency concerns, 
the UN has attempted to organize representative councils that 
will better articulate the interests and concerns of ordinary 
Darfuris during peace negotiations.106  The rebel leaders have 
not welcomed this development.  As Andrew Natsios, the US 
Special Envoy to the Sudan was informed during a recent visit 
to the region: “One of the rebel leaders, Abdel Wahid-al-Nur . . . 
has threatened through his henchmen in the camps to kill 
anyone who volunteers to serve on the councils.”107 
 
Far from constituting a cohesive political front, the rebel 
leaders consist largely of unelected spoilers from different 
ethnic groups in the Darfur region and beyond with disparate 
interests who are often at odds with each other.  For instance, 
in July 2005, Mini Minawi’s Zaghawa faction of the SLA 
launched an attack against the Abdel Wahid’s Fur faction, 
killing more than 70 people and raping 39 women.108 Since the 
2003 rebellion itself, the rebels have further splintered into 
dozens of groups, each with a different agenda and in 
competition with each other for the political spoils that are 
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likely to emerge from any eventual settlement.109  Some of the 
rebel leaders and their key supporters come from backgrounds 
that are divorced from Darfur altogether: Hassan al-Turabi, 
who is a sponsor of the JEM, is of Arab origin and was formerly 
spiritual mentor to both President El-Bashir and Osama Bin 
Laden;110 and Abdel Karim Bari (Tek) of the National 
Movement for Reform and Development, is a former Zaghawa 
dissident officer in the Chadian army who is currently on the 
UN sanctions list for alleged war crimes.111        
 
 While provocation has yielded the Darfur rebel leaders 
some concrete political benefits, it has rarely come with any 
significant attendant costs to them--militarily or otherwise.  
Since the rebellion started five years ago, hardly any key rebel 
leader has been killed or seriously injured in battle.  For the 
most part, the rebel leaders have managed successfully to 
insulate themselves directly from the fallout of much of the 
carnage occurring in the region.  Indeed, one of the key rebel 
leaders—Abdel Wahid—has safely ensconced himself in Paris 
for the past two years from where he continues to make trips to 
internationally-mediated peace negotiations. Of course, some 
rebel leaders have suffered from the Khartoum government’s 
ability to strip away at some of their political leverage through 
its “divide and rule” tactics, but hardly any of them have found 
themselves in a worse off condition that they were at the 
beginning of the rebellion.112     
  
 In response to the rebels’ provocative behavior, the 
Sudanese government has adopted an unconventional strategy, 
deploying nomadic Arab militias known as the Janjaweed to 
attack and raze black Darfur settlements.113  The Sudanese air 
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force has also engaged in air raids in support of the militias,114 
but the Sudanese government’s decision not to engage the 
rebels exclusively through conventional military means has 
been the source of significant controversy within the ruling 
regime.115  In any event, the Janjaweed’s brutal tactics has 
deservedly proven to be an international public relations 
debacle for the Sudanese government.  But from a purely 
military standpoint, it is not obvious that the Sudanese 
government’s decision to deploy the Janjaweed was irrational.  
 
 The Sudanese government had to confront certain 
unpleasant realities about a conventional military approach at 
the early stages of the rebellion:  (1) because the regular 
Sudanese army had a significant number of black Darfur 
conscripts, its loyalty in squashing the rebellion in the region 
was suspect;116 and (2) the use of irregular Arab militias was 
considered much more cost-effective than deploying 
conventional forces.117 This latter factor led one commentator 
to declare that the Sudanese government was waging
“counterinsurgency on the cheap.”
 a 
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backfired: as the Janjaweed unleashed a savage 
counterinsurgency that has left thousands of innocent civilians 
dead and millions displaced, it created an international outcry 
that had the unintended effect of initially elevating the stature 
of some of the rebel leaders.  
 
While the Sudanese government might have lost the 
public relations battle against the rebels, its unconventional 
tactics might have yielded some concrete military benefits.  
More specifically, its strategy of alternately attacking civilian 
Darfur settlements and then offering generous concessions to 
particular rebel spoilers has significantly splintered the Darfur 
rebels, thereby weakening the rebels’ negotiating leverage.121  
This strategy has potential significant downstream benefits for 
the government because it suggests that even if a 
comprehensive peace settlement is eventually negotiated, it 
might be easily be able to subvert implementation of the 
agreement on account of the lack of rebel unity. The latter 
scenario is not entirely hypothetical.  Indeed, the southern 
SPLA has repeatedly threatened to drop out of the current 
coalition government because it alleges that the Khartoum 
government has consistently undermined the implementation 
of the 2004 North-South agreement.122  
 
Let us assume for the moment that a negotiated 
settlement is somehow possible in Darfur.  How stable is it 
likely to be?  Given Khartoum’s track record in implementing 
the North-South agreement, it has shown that it is adept at 
scuttling long-term power-sharing commitments and playing 
off various opposition groups against each other.123  Since the 
Darfur rebel groups are far less cohesive and organized than the 
SPLA, the prospects for any sustainable peace agreement do not 
look particularly promising.  Moreover, given the reluctance of 
western governments and the African Union to launch a more 
robust intervention force now that Darfur is constantly in the 
media spotlight, it is unlikely that the international community 
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will be willing to invest the resources to monitor the long-term 
implementation of an agreement once the “CNN effect” 
surrounding the crisis has receded.  But whatever the outcome 
of any future peace negotiations between the Sudanese 
government and the rebels, it is likely to include tangible 
benefits to the rebel leaders, such as government posts, money, 
or other perks.  Indeed, various rebel spoilers have already 
taken advantage of the government’s generosity in return for a 
commitment to undermine other rebel leaders who are still 
holding out.124   The Sudanese government might also succeed 
in politically emasculating the Darfur region if it displaces or 
kills a significant portion of its residents.  Thus, regardless of 
how the Darfur crisis unfolds, the upshot for both the rebel 
leaders and the Khartoum regime is that they can potentially 
improve their status quo ex ante.  In the end, the groups that 




 The events that propelled the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) to launch a rebellion against the Serbian government 
have been the source of an engaging and lively academic debate 
about the merits of NATO’s Balkan strategy.125  The 
conventional narrative, at least in NATO policy circles, was that 
it was extremist Serbian elements in Belgrade who fostered the 
conditions that created both the KLA and the subsequent 
humanitarian crisis that the rebellion spawned in 1999.126   
According to that narrative, Milosevic instigated the crisis in 
1989 by revoking Kosovo’s regional autonomy and embarking 
on a systematic campaign to marginalize the Albanian majority 
in the region.127  The KLA was purportedly created as a 
response to Serbia’s discriminatory policies.  In 1998, after 
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facing degrading treatment by the Serbs for a decade, the 
Kosovar Albanians were left with no option but to launch a 
rebellion.  NATO then had to step in at the last moment in 1999 
to avert Serbian genocidal violence against Kosovo’s Albanian 
majority.      
 
 Recently, however, commentators have begun to 
question this narrative.  For instance, Alan Kuperman has 
persuasively argued that it was the threat of NATO’s 
intervention that created the dynamic that led to Serbia’s 
genocidal violence against the Kosovar Albanians in the first 
place.128  More specifically, Kuperman shows that the KLA 
initiated a high risk rebellion in 1998 hoping that the prospect 
of a brutal Serbian response would tip NATO’s decision calculus 
squarely in favor of military intervention.129  Provoking a 
genocidal response from Belgrade seemed a worthwhile 
rational gamble by the KLA because the KLA had recently 
witnessed how similar genocidal violence by the Serbs had 
instigated humanitarian intervention by NATO on behalf of 
Muslim rebels in Bosnia.130  The KLA rebel leaders understood 
that a military victory against the more dominant Serbian army 
was implausible, yet the prospect of a NATO intervention 
dramatically lowered the risks of a provocative rebellion.  As 
one of the Kosovo Albanian negotiators subsequently conceded 
in an interview: “The more civilians were killed, the chances of 
intervention became bigger, and the KLA of course realized 
that.”131 
 
 My argument here complements this growing literature 
by showing that the rebellion and the subsequent NATO 
intervention catapulted the KLA leadership from relative 
obscurity and anonymity into key power brokers.  More 
specifically, the KLA exploited the post-rebellion Serbian 
reprisals to shore up its marginal status as a political 
organization and consolidate allegiance to its goals and tactics, 
even when it barely enjoyed any significant support among 
Kosovo Albanians.  Also, rather than dampen the prospects of 
atrocities, the threat of a NATO intervention actually 
emboldened the resolve of hard-line KLA leaders, who took 
advantage of the threat to isolate and weaken moderate Kosovo 
leaders who preferred a more conciliatory approach to resolving 
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the crisis.  In sum, the KLA employed appeals to ethnic 
solidarity and nationalist sentiments to alter the domestic 
political landscape in Kosovo in favor of violently seeking 
independence.  
 
 Prior to 1997, the KLA was a relatively marginal player in 
Kosovo’s political scene.  As an ideological group committed to 
violent political challenge, KLA faced daunting challenges in its 
quest to attract either resources or recruits.  As Tim Judah 
observed: “The KLA [in 1996] consisted of some 150  men and . 
. . most Kosovars, let alone people outside of Kosovo, had heard 
of them.”132 Despite some Albanian disenchantment with 
Belgrade’s decision to strip Kosovo of its autonomy in 1989, 
Kosovar Albanians under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova for 
the most part embraced a pragmatic approach to resolving the 
crisis.133  Rugova favored passive resistance and hoped informal 
international pressure would bring Belgrade to the table to 
negotiate the autonomy issue.134  Although there were some 
simmering grievances, very few Kosovar Albanians seemed to 
have the appetite to embark on what seemed like a hopeless 
rebellion against the Serbs.  More importantly, the Serbian 
leadership felt little need to adopt strong-arm tactics against 
the Kosovar Albanians; thus, up until the KLA started 
escalating attacks against Serb targets in 1997, there was hardly 
any large scale violence deployed by either side in the region. 
 
     Two events foreshadowed a change in the Kosovo 
political landscape that significantly diminished the political 
stature of moderates like Rugova and emboldened the KLA.  
The first was the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 under which 
NATO forced the Serbian leadership to make significant 
concessions to both Bosnian Muslims and the Croatians.135  The 
second was the Albanian pyramid financial scandal of 1997.  
The latter event triggered a descent into political anarchy in 
Albania and the subsequent looting provided a ready source of 
both guns and funds to the KLA rebels.136 The former event 
suggested to a growing number of Kosovar Albanians that a 
violent insurrection against the Serbs might be a plausible 
strategy.  In other words, after both the Bosnians and Croatians 
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had launched violent rebellions against the Serbians despite 
overwhelming military odds, the west intervened in response to 
the genocidal retaliation and facilitated a peace settlement that 
forced the Serbians to make significant concessions.  To the 
mediators in Ohio, however, Kosovo was not a key priority and 
it was not discussed as part of the settlement.137 For Kosovar 
Albanians who choose a more peaceful and conciliatory 
approach to the Serbs, the Dayton Peace Accords seemed like a 
slap in the face.138   
 
The KLA resorted to a two prong strategy to capitalize on 
the fallout from Dayton. First, they escalated their attacks 
against Serbian targets and launched a full blown rebellion in 
1998 hoping to trigger reprisals, and then they used the Serb 
crackdowns to try to convince previously skeptical Kosovar 
Albanians that violent resistance was the only available option. 
The KLA leaders calculated, somewhat correctly, that ordinary 
Kosovar Albanians would be more sympathetic to a hard-line 
nationalist stance against the Serbs given the concessions made 
by the Serbs to the Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Dayton.139 
Second, and most importantly, the KLA gambled that the 
worsening humanitarian crisis in the region would make it 
difficult for NATO to ignore Kosovo as it did in Dayton.  
Ironically, despite the fact that the KLA was able to recruit large 
number of participants and grew substantially in its first years 
of operation, it still did not enjoy significant political support 
among ordinary Kosovar Albanians.  In an election held in 
March 1998, the year the KLA launched its rebellion, Rugova 
and his moderate LDK (Democratic League of Kosova) party 
gained an overwhelming victory despite KLA calls to boycott 
the election.140   
 
In the end, the escalation of the crisis in Kosovo did get 
NATO’s attention. After a series of botched attempts at peaceful 
negotiations, NATO issued an ultimatum to Milosevic in 1999 
at Rambouillet, France to surrender Kosovo sovereignty for an 
interim period of three years or risk a sustained bombing 
attack.141  Milosevic refused to accede to NATO’s demands and 
shortly thereafter NATO mounted an aerial bombing campaign 
                                                 
137 See DAALDER & O’HANLON, supra note __ at 9. 
138 See Judah, supra  at 124-26. 
139 See MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND ALBANIAN: A HISTORY 
OF KOSOVO 289 (1998). 
140 See Judah, supra note __ at 146.  
141 See Judah, supra note at 206-26. 
 49
against Serbia.142  Apparently, NATO strategists assumed that 
Milosevic would cave in quickly after the bombing started or 
that the bombing itself would trigger some kind of regime 
change in Serbia.143  In the end, NATO’s strategy backfired.  
Rather than forcing Milosevic to back down immediately, he 
escalated the level of atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians.  
By the time Milosevic had capitulated after 11 weeks of NATO 
bombings, Serb forces had killed as many as 5,000 Kosovo 
Albanians and displaced or deported another 850,000.144 
 
The Kosovo crisis reveals the kind of security dilemma 
that can be created by determined but marginal spoilers in 
ethnic conflicts.  Despite the reality that most Kosovar 
Albanians did not seem enthusiastic about a violent 
confrontation with the Serbs in the 19990s, the KLA’s tactics 
were able to precipitate Serbian reprisals that in turn triggered 
a humanitarian response by NATO.  To be sure, the Serbs could 
have probably deflated the KLA’s strategy by being more 
conciliatory and accommodating to Kosovar Albanian political 
moderates like Rugova.  But given the presence of both the 
KLA’s violent tactics and NATO’s escalating threats, Milosevic 
probably calculated that any concessions to Kosovar Albanians 
would be construed as weakness by his domestic audience.  
Similarly, Rugova, who had been a long-time advocate of 
peaceful negotiation, would probably have found it harder in 
the face of Serbian reprisals to respond to any peace gesture 
that would have Kosovar Albanians give up on demands for 
independence or greater autonomy.   In the end, the KLA’s 
tactics probably widened the gulf between a peace settlement 
on both sides of the crisis.  
 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES  
 
The claim that humanitarian interventions and 
international prosecutions can have unintended effects begs the 
question:  if humanitarian intervention might cause some 
atrocities but prevent others, what are its net effects on the level 
of atrocities?  There is probably no easy answer to this question 
because it is difficult to determine a priori those humanitarian 
                                                 
142 See Judah, supra note at 229-34. 
143 See Judah, supra note at 228-29. 
144 See Judah, supra note __ at 241; Joanne Mariner, Kosovo’s 
Unquiet Dead, CNN Findlaw Forum, June 20, 1001, available at 
www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/columns/fl.mariner.kosovo.06.20/ 
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atrocities that never occurred because of the plausible threat of 
a humanitarian intervention.  Any humanitarian intervention 
regime presents the familiar empirical problem of the “dog that 
did not bark.”  Of course, one might try to isolate circumstances 
where atrocities have already begun before humanitarian 
intervention occurred and ask how intervention affected the 
level of atrocities, but that analysis would still be infected by a 
selection bias that would likely give us an inaccurate picture of 
the effect of humanitarian interventions.  For instance, one 
might argue that for dominant groups that are particularly 
sensitive to military retaliation by the international community, 
even a marginal increase in the risk of intervention might be 
sufficient to deter them from committing atrocities.  
 
One possible solution to this problem would be to isolate 
all instances in which a civil war or significant rebellion took 
place and ask why atrocities took place in certain contexts, and 
not others.  The problem with such an approach, however, is 
that it will prove ultimately difficult to attribute any decision by 
a perpetrator to embark or not embark on atrocities to the risk 
of humanitarian intervention since the threat of some form of 
external intervention is presumably present in all civil wars.  
Moreover, humanitarian interventions and international 
prosecutions might have indirect effects on the decision by 
oppositional groups to embark on civil wars and rebellions in 
the first place.  For instance, certain minority or subordinate 
groups that have strong strategic ties with third-party states 
might find it unnecessary to initiate rebellions as a means to 
achieve political goals, thereby making it less likely that such a 
group will be involved in a civil war.  Of course, the dynamic 
could cut both ways:  certain groups might be more willing to 
initiate civil wars and rebellions if they believe that downstream 
intervention by third-party states makes it more likely that they 
will extract important concessions from the dominant groups. 
 
In sum, since the empirical question of the net effects of 
humanitarian interventions and prosecution is plagued by 
uncertainty, it would be premature to assume that either 
dramatically expanding or reducing the number interventions 
or prosecutions will be beneficial.145  But are there legal or 
                                                 
145 Some commentators have argued that interventions that focus on 
stopping perpetrators tend to decrease the severity of mass atrocities.  See 
Matthew Krain, International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides 
and Politicides, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. (2005) (providing empirical data to 
support such a relationship).  But such studies do not address the moral 
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other strategic policy changes to the current humanita
intervention and prosecution regime that might alleviate some 
of its perverse effects?  Are there ways the international 
community might continue to engage in humanitarian 
interventions without undermining the possible benign effects 
of such interventions?  To explore some of those questions, Part 
V discusses some legal and political changes to the current 
humanitarian regime that might mitigate some of the regime’s 
perverse effects. 
rian 
                                                                                                                 
 
V. NORMATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
What legal and political changes would alleviate the 
some of the unintended effects of humanitarian interventions 
on the level of atrocities?  This Part argues that the 
humanitarian intervention regime should try to adopt some of 
the insights of comparative fault from the domestic corrective 
justice framework.  Section A suggests that the international 
community could try to reduce the benefits to rebel leaders of 
humanitarian intervention when such leaders have engaged in 
provocative behavior against dominant groups, which is how a 
comparative fault mechanism works in the domestic torts 
regime.  Section B suggests that another approach would be to 
allow the rebel leaders’ provocative behavior to absolve 
perpetrators from certain sanctions and prosecutions by 
international criminal tribunals, which is how the defense of 
provocation partly works in domestic criminal law.    
 
A. Applying Comparative Fault Principles to 
Interventions 
 
One way to discourage rebel leaders from engaging in 
provocative behavior against dominant groups is to adopt a 
comparative fault approach which would limit the political and 
 
hazard problem we have identified, which involves the risk that the prospect 
of intervention might lead rebel leaders to engage in high risk or provocative 
behavior against dominant groups in the first place.  In other words, it will 
be difficult to make any conclusive empirical generalizations about the net 
effect of humanitarian interventions on the level of atrocities unless one can 
also isolate the risks that humanitarian interventions might actually cause 
some atrocities.  Indeed, Krain seems to assume away the possibility that 
humanitarian interventions could have any effect on the strategy of rebel 
leaders.  See id. at 365 (“Any attempt to understand how intervention might 
affect the severity of genocides or politicides must focus on the 
intervention’s effect on the perpetrator rather than multiple sides in a 
conflict.”).  
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economic benefits rebel leaders stand to gain from 
humanitarian interventions.  Evidence of a systematic and 
continuous pattern of provocative behavior against a dominant 
group could be treated as a proximate cause of any resultant 
humanitarian crisis, which would result in a reduction of 
benefits to the victim groups.  The implicit assumption in this 
framework is that both the rebel leaders and the perpetrators 
would be jointly responsible for the resultant harm to the 
victims and the relevant humanitarian intervention regime 
would try to ensure the both groups internalize the costs of 
their actions.146  Of course, the international community might 
decide to apply appropriate evidentiary principles in making 
judgments as to whether any provocative behavior by a victim 
group is a proximate cause of any particular atrocity, including 
possibly requiring that the various incidents have some 
temporal proximity to the alleged provocative behavior.   
 
The comparative fault principle in a humanitarian 
intervention context could work in one of two ways:  (1) the 
imposition of lustration against the rebel leaders upon the 
successful completion of a humanitarian intervention; (2) the 
refusal of the international community to impose (or force) any 
political solution to the underlying conflict that fuelled the 
atrocities.  In both scenarios, the proportionality of the 
dominant group’s response to the provocation would obviously 
be a factor in determining how significantly the international 
community should reduce the benefits to the rebel groups. For 
instance, a grossly disproportionate retaliation by the dominant 
group might warrant an intervention that specifically gives 
military leverage to the rebel group.  
 
In the case of lustration, rebel leaders who expect that a 
humanitarian intervention would help them secure a favorable 
power-sharing arrangement with the dominant group would be 
out of luck.147  To be sure, any such lustration principle would 
                                                 
146 For an argument that a properly calibrated comparative 
negligence regime would provide the best incentives to both victims and 
injurers in a tort scheme to take optimal precautions, see Ezra Friedman, 
The Robust Efficiency of Comparative Negligence (Oct. 22, 2007) 
(unpublished article on file with authors).  
147 Lustration, which commonly involves barring individuals 
implicated in past crimes and atrocities from holding public office, is a very 
common transitional justice instrument.  For a discussion of lustration laws 
in post-Cold War Europe, see Roman David, Lustration Laws in Action: The 
Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and 
Poland (1989-2001), 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387 (2003); see also Mark S. 
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also preclude the transfer of economic resources or any 
territorial concessions to the rebel leaders or to the victim 
groups generally, but would not necessarily preclude efforts by 
the international community to engage in rehabilitation efforts 
that narrowly target injured victims.  In this picture, the 
international community could invest resources in addressing 
specific harms suffered by the victims of mass atrocities, but 
avoid any efforts which are likely to resolve the underlying 
conflict in favor of the rebel groups.  Such a narrow application 
of the lustration sanction that allows injured victims some relief 
but denies political spoils to the rebel leaders would accord with 
comparative fault principles.  These principles suggest that the 
victims should not be barred completely from any recovery, but 
that their recovery should be reduced based on their level of 
fault.148   
 
Of course, lustration by itself will not necessarily provide 
the optimal division of liability between the perpetrators and 
the rebel leaders.  For instance, a blanket lustration regime that 
targets all rebel leaders who engage in provocative behavior will 
not account for the fact that different rebel leaders exercise 
varying levels of precautions across different conflicts.  But no 
existing comparative fault regime in the domestic torts context 
appears to calibrate the distribution of liability (or 
responsibility) between the tortfeasor and victims in a precise 
and exacting manner.149  In any event, while obviously less than 
an ideal outcome, lustration surely seems better than the status 
quo in which rebel leaders usually gain significant political 
benefits in the wake of a humanitarian intervention.    
   
Similarly, when the international community intervenes 
in civil wars where rebel leaders have engaged in provocative 
behavior against dominant groups, it should not attempt to 
impose (or encourage) the parties to negotiate a long-term 
political solution to the conflict.  The international community 
should not be in the business of helping the combatants settle 
                                                                                                                  
Ellis, Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former 
Communist Bloc, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 181 (1997). 
148 See Friedman, supra note 146 at *5 (suggesting that the optimal 
comparative fault regime for negligence would increase the relevant party’s 
share of liability with that party’s carelessness).  
149 See id. at *9 (“One significant difficulty with applying a 
comparative negligence rule is that it requires juries and judges to quantify 
the amount by which each party was negligent . . . Without specific 
guidelines for allocating shares of negligence, any division is at best 
subjective if not arbitrary.”).  
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their own disputes, especially when one side might lack the 
resources or resolve to reach a favorable settlement in the 
absence of humanitarian intervention.  Otherwise, the 
international community will simply become a pawn in the 
rebel leader’s strategy to extract favorable political concessions 
from the dominant group.   
 
The problem is that when rebel leaders fail to bear 
ultimate responsibility for prosecuting their claims through the 
use of force they have an incentive to free ride off the efforts of 
third parties who intervene in the conflict.  In this picture, the 
intervention of third party states obscures the real risks and 
costs associated with initiating a high stakes rebellion in the 
first place.  The domestic torts regime deals with this free-
riding risk not only through the application of comparative fault 
principles but also by imposing on the victim the responsibility 
of litigating her own tort claims.  In any event, by denying or 
limiting relief to rebel leaders who attempt to free ride on 
outside intervention, the international community will 
encourage rebel leaders to only initiate rebellions that are cost-
effective and that have a plausible chance of success absent 
third-party intervention.  Put differently, a comparative fault 
regime will discourage rebel leaders from redistributing the 
risks of suicidal rebellions to the international community.  
 
Finally, a humanitarian regime based on comparative 
fault principles would be consistent with the emerging 
international law norm of the responsibility to protect.  While 
the scope of this new international norm is unclear, and it is 
still questionable whether it is an international norm at all, the 
UN Outcome document discussing the norm makes it clear that 
the primary responsibility of protecting individuals from 
humanitarian atrocities still resides in the state in which such 
atrocities take place,150and that the international community 
only has the residual responsibility to use both peaceful and 
other humanitarian means to help protect populations from 
atrocities when the host state has failed to act.  By suggesting 
that the primary obligation resides primarily with the state in 
which atrocities take place, the UN Outcome Document 
implicitly recognizes that the relevant groups engaged in a civil 
                                                 
150 See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, at Synopsis 1(a) (2001)  (“State 
sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself.”).  
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war have the responsibility to take precautions to make sure 
their followers are not harmed.151  In a sense, a comparative 
liability regime would give the combatants the incentives to 
take these responsibilities seriously.   
 
An alternative strategy for reducing the unintended 
effects identified thus far is for the international community to 
adopt more rigorous criteria in deciding the kinds of rebellions 
in which to intervene.152  The international community could 
try to screen out opportunistic rebellions and only provide 
humanitarian relief when there is evidence that the rebels have 
a reasonable chance to obtain concessions by force of arms 
against the dominant group in the absence of intervention.  In 
theory, the classic international law principles governing 
belligerents were supposed to serve as such a screening device.  
These principles recognized that external interventions in 
support of budding rebellions could lead to widespread internal 
instability, increased communal violence, and a possible 
breakdown of the state itself.  Thus, third-parties were not 
permitted under international law to recognize rebels on equal 
terms with the state in a civil war until the rebels had acquired 
substantial territory by force of arms and attained belligerent 
status.153  Without demonstrating to the international 
                                                 
151 Of course, this obligation rests formally with the state, but in civil 
conflicts where the state is weak, rebel leaders ostensibly act as sovereign 
elements in their territories.    
152Indeed, one way insurance companies deal with this problem is 
that they tend to raise the insurance premium significantly whenever they 
think there is a high risk of moral hazard.  See Jonathan R. Macey, 
Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for Deregulation, 
23 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2006) (discussing regulatory schemes that link 
political insurance premiums with moral hazard risks). 
153 Oppenheim observes that a legal belligerent had to meet four 
conditions to qualify for treatment as legal combatants: 
 
[T]he existence of a civil war accompanied by a state of general 
hostilities; occupation and measures of orderly administration of a 
substantial part of national territory by the insurgents; observance 
of the rules of warfare on the part of the insurgent forces acting 
under a responsible authority; the practical necessity for third States 
to define their attitude to the civil war .....”  
 
LASSA P. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 76 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 
ed., 7th ed. 1952); see also Lieutenant Colonel Yair M. Lootsteen, The 
Concept of Belligerency in International Law, 166 MIL. L. REV. 109, 114 
(2000) (discussing how the law belligerency applies to armed conflicts 
under international law and the importance of holding territory); David 
Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military 
Intervention in Internal Conflict, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 440 
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community that they had both widespread support and the 
resources to prosecute a war effectively against the state, rebels 
would be denied all the courtesies and privileges accorded to 
legal combatants, including the possibility of external military 
assistance.154  Indeed, even when rebels had attained the status 
of belligerents, third parties who wished to remain neutral 
could not lend any assistance to either side.155  Today, these 
international principles governing belligerents have become 
obsolete as both strategic and humanitarian third-party 
interventions have become the norm. 
 
B.  Allowing a Partial Defense of Provocative Rebellion 
 
Perpetrators of atrocities are routinely subject to a range 
of sanctions imposed by the international community, 
including economic boycotts, travel bans, financial account 
freezes, and criminal prosecutions by international criminal 
tribunals.156  Some of these sanctions can be imposed in the 
absence of humanitarian intervention, but others are usually 
imposed only when intervention has taken place, such as when 
perpetrators from dominant groups are indicted and tried 
before international criminal tribunals.  But the international 
community could allow a provocation defense that would 
reduce such sanctions.  Like the defendant in a domestic 
criminal context, the international community could recognize 
a defense of deliberate provocation by victims (or rebel 
leaders), which would mitigate the sanctions faced by the 
perpetrator of atrocities.  Of course, the proportionality of the 
dominant group’s response to the provocation should be a 
                                                                                                                  
(1996) (arguing that military intervention in support of rebels interferes 
with a state’s internal affairs).  Indeed, the Supreme Court applied the 
belligerency test to confederate rebels during the American Civil War.  See 
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S.  (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1863) (“[W]hen the party in 
rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; 
have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have 
organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former 
sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a 
war.”). 
154 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, International Law Governing Aid 
to Opposition Groups in Civil War: Resurrecting the Standards of 
Belligerency, 63 WASH. L. REV. 43, 56 (1988)  (discussing the belligerency 
standard in international law). 
155 See Wippman, supra note __at 442 (observing that those who 
wish to remain neutral could not assist either side in the conflict). 
156 For a detailed analysis of the prosecution of perpetrators before 
international criminal tribunals, see MARK A DRUMBL, ATROCITY, 
PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW __ (2007).   
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factor in deciding the appropriate level of punishment against 
perpetrators. 
 
Although criminal sanctions in the domestic context 
tend to focus exclusively on the incentives of perpetrators, 
many commentators have observed that criminal law applies a 
version of the relative fault principle from torts when it partially 
absolves perpetrators from punishment based on the victims’ 
provocative behavior.157  For instance, the defense of 
provocation or “heat of passion,” which is available in all 
jurisdictions in the United States, downgrades an offense of 
murder to manslaughter when the defendant can prove that he 
killed another in the heat of passion after a provocation.158   
 
Typically, commentators have justified the provocation 
defense as either a partial excuse or a partial justification, but 
more recently law and economics scholars have suggested that 
the defense not only provides the correct incentives for the 
potential perpetrator but also for the potential victim.159  The 
defense might affect the incentives of the victim to engage in 
provocative behavior through two different mechanisms.  First, 
it might do so directly by decreasing the vindictive pleasure that 
victims might get from seeing their perpetrators punished.160  
Second, it might do so indirectly because perpetrators will be 
less inclined to target victims who take appropriate precautions 
and do not engage in provocative behavior.161  Potential victims 
                                                 
157 Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of Criminal Law 
Attempts, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 317 (1996) (“Mitigating the punishment for 
offenders who commit homicide as a result of provoked, uncontrollable 
passion provides incentives to potential victims to abstain from provocative 
behavior.”); See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law:  The 
Case for a Comparative Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. 
REV. 1181, 1216 (1994) (“A legal system in which provocation functions as a 
partial defense provides incentives both for the potential victim to avoid 
provocation (by reducing the punishment levied on persons who commit 
homicide as a result of provocation) and for the person who considers 
committing homicide to avoid carrying it out (by imposing criminal 
sanctions upon him).”). 
158 See Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law, supra note 
___at 1213-1217.  
159 See Ben-Shahar & Harel, The Economics of Criminal Law 
Attempts, supra note157  at 316-18.  
160 See id.; see also Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated 
Revenge, 87 Boston Univ. L Rev. 1059, 1062 (2007) (“[V]ictims regard 
punishment [by the state] as an important device for restoring losses to their 
self worth and status.”)  
161 See id. 
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will have an incentive to take greater precautions if they know 
they are less likely to be targeted by perpetrators. 
 
  In any event, one need not subscribe to such accounts 
of victim motivation in a domestic context to see that reducing 
sanctions targeted at perpetrators will likely affect the 
incentives of victims in a humanitarian crisis.  Unlike domestic 
victims in a criminal context, victims facing atrocities in the 
context of a civil war stand to gain more than “vindictive” 
benefits from the suffering of their perpetrators.  Because the 
perpetrators and victims of atrocities are usually also political 
and military adversaries, any outside sanctions targeted at 
perpetrators will tend to translate to concrete benefits to the 
victims and their leaders.  In the zero-sum world in which many 
of these rebellions take place, any outside sanctions inflicted 
against a dominant group increases the chance—even if 
marginally--that the dominant group will eventually make some 
sort of concession to the rebels.   
 
Pursuing this incentive based analysis a little further, 
victims of atrocities would likely be more motivated than 
domestic victims of crime to internalize the costs of provocative 
behavior if they are aware that such behavior will reduce the 
sanctions targeted at perpetrators.  Unlike punishment in the 
domestic criminal context,  sanctions targeted at perpetrators 
of atrocities may for all intensive purposes be treated as a form 
of tort-like compensation for victims.  Given this dynamic, we 
have now almost come full circle in o analysis: in the current 
humanitarian intervention regime, sanctions targeted against a 
perpetrator are likely to present the same kinds of moral hazard 
risks as other forms of political benefits that victim groups gain 
from intervention that do not account for the relative fault of 
the victim leaders.  
 
Turning to the perpetrators of atrocities, reducing 
external sanctions based on the level of provocation can also 
positively influence the manner in which perpetrators choose 
targets of atrocities.  If the harshest sanctions are only imposed 
on perpetrators who target victims who have not engaged in 
provocative behavior, then perpetrators might be deterred from 
targeting such victims.  But if the international community 
imposes the harshest sanctions against perpetrators regardless 
of the provocative behavior of the victims, then the perpetrator 
has an incentive to inflict the harshest level of atrocities against 
any rebel group (or non-combatants from such a group) 
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regardless of the rebel group’s behavior.  Thus, disregarding the 
provocative behavior of victims in a sanctions regime raises the 
familiar problem posed by marginal deterrence.  As put by a 
noted economist, “[i]f the thief has his hand cut off for taking 
five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.”162  At bottom, the 
intuition is that we should discourage perpetrators from 
committing atrocities on an even larger scale because of a 
failure to distinguish between the sanctions targeting two 
offenses of different magnitude;163 in this case, one might argue 
that mass killings targeted at a victim group that has engaged in 
provocative behavior is of a different magnitude from mass 
killings targeted at a victim group that has not. 
 
In sum, even more than in the domestic criminal law 
context, there is probably a greater need to apply relative fault 
principles when deciding which kinds of sanctions to mete out 
against perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities.  Both as a 
means of discouraging victims from engaging in high risk 
behavior and for discouraging perpetrators from committing 
the most egregious atrocities regardless how badly the victims 
act, a system of escalating sanctions based on victim 
provocation makes sense.  More importantly, a sanctions 
system based on relative fault suggests a more general way of 
addressing the reality that sanctions targeted towards 
perpetrators sometimes function like benefits to victims (or 
victim leaders) in the context of a rebellion or civil war. 
 
 
VI:  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:  IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 
 
Under the relative fault scheme, this Article argues that 
adjusting the benefits available to victims and the sanctions 
targeted at perpetrators can influence the victims to take 
adequate precautions to avoid atrocities and discourage 
perpetrators from engaging in the most heinous atrocities.  In 
large part, this approach expands on the retributive and 
deterrent framework of the humanitarian intervention and 
prosecution regime that focuses on perpetrators and extends 
                                                 
162 See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970). 
163 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
2385 (1997) (discussing the role of  marginal deterrence in criminal law); 
Dan M. Kahan, Response: Between Economics and Sociology: The New 
Path Of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997) (same).  
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that framework to the provocative behavior of rebel leaders in 
the context of a civil war or rebellion. 
 
This framework raises an obvious question concerning a 
possible role for the international criminal court.  If the 
international criminal court can be used as an instrument to 
influence the incentives of perpetrators, why can it not be used 
to target rebel leaders who engage in provocative acts that 
instigate atrocities?  In other words, instead of recalibrating the 
sanctions targeting perpetrators and the benefits available to 
victims from humanitarian interventions, why not haul the 
rebel leaders who engage in provocative behavior before the 
international criminal court? 
 
An exploration of the merits and the scope of the 
international criminal court, and of its possible effects on the 
behavior of perpetrator or victims, is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Suffice it to observe that various commentators have 
not only questioned the deterrent effects of international 
criminal tribunals generally,164 but have also raised concerns as 
to whether these tribunals might actually exacerbate the level of 
humanitarian atrocities.165  But bracketing for now these 
significant criticisms, there are additional reasons why 
prosecution by an international criminal tribunals would not be 
an appropriate mechanism for addressing provocative behavior 
by rebel groups in the context of a civil war or rebellion. 
 
First, many if not most provocative actions by rebel 
leaders will likely fall short of qualifying as a crime that falls 
                                                 
164 See MARK A DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 156 at 169-73 (questioning the deterrence effect of 
international criminal tribunals); William W. Burke-White, 
Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as a Part 
of a System of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L 557, 587 (2005) (observing the methodological 
difficulties with trying to show that international criminal tribunals deter 
atrocities). 
165 Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals 
Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities ?, 84 WASH U. L REV. 777 
(2006) (suggesting that evidence that perpetrators already face preexisting 
sanctions that are more severe and certain than those meted out by 
international criminal tribunals undermines claims that those tribunals will 
have a deterrent effect ); Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trial and Error: 
Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L 
SECURITY 5, 6 (2004) (expressing doubt over deterrence effects of 
international criminal tribunals and suggesting that they make peace 
settlements more difficult). 
 61
under the jurisdiction of the international criminal court and 
virtually all ad-hoc international criminal tribunals.  For 
instance, the Rome Treaty that establishes the international 
criminal court makes it clear that its jurisdiction is limited to 
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.”166  Specifically, these serious crimes of 
concern have included:  “War Crimes,” “Crimes Against 
Humanity,” “Genocide,” and “Aggression.”167  While the first 
three crimes are relatively uncontroversial and are proscribed 
by the Geneva Convention,168 member states have yet to agree 
to what kinds of actions would constitute an act of aggression; 
so presumably, that crime is still outside the ICC’s jurisdiction 
until member states can reach an acceptable definition.169  In 
any event, the relevant crimes usually have to occur during a 
war and involve systematic attacks against civilian populations, 
which would probably exclude much of the provocative 
behavior by rebel leaders.170 
 
                                                 
166 Rome Statute, supra note __at art. 5.1 (d).  
167 See id.  
168Michael O'Donovan, Criminalizing War: Toward a Justifiable 
Crime of Aggression, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 507, 507-08 (2007) 
(“The inclusion of the first three crimes was undisputed. The crime of 
aggression, however, was highly controversial, and remains divisive today. 
Unlike the first three crimes, the crime of aggression implicates not only 
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definition of the more widely accepted category of “crimes against 
humanity” has been subject to controversy.  See Beth Van Schaack, The 
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999).  
169Alberto L. Zuppie, Aggression as International Crime: 
Unattainable Crusade or Finally Conquering the Evil?, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. 
REV. 1 (2007) (discussing difficulties with international efforts to define the 
contours of the crime of aggression); Grant M. Dawson Defining 
Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression,?, 19 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 419-420 (2000) (discussing how the 
Preparatory Commission has been charged with finding a definition but does 
not have one yet.).  
170 See Starr, supra note __ at 1269 (observing that the focus of 
these international crimes is on civilian deaths during a crisis or wartime).  
The treaties establishing the various international criminal tribunals tended 
to limit their jurisdiction to atrocities targeting civilian populations.  For 
instance, Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute reads (emphasis added): 
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any 
of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.  
Rome Statute, supra note __, at art. 7.1 
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Second, investigations and prosecutions by international 
criminal tribunals are both relatively expensive and politically 
controversial and it is unlikely that the international 
community has either the political will or the resources to 
extend the jurisdiction of these tribunals to a new category of 
crimes involving provocative rebel leaders.  For instance, the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda has tried only 26 individuals 
in its seven year existence (at a cost of $1 billion) and has only 
26 trials underway.171  Only 20 more individuals have been 
indicted and the tribunal estimates that it may complete 70 
trials by the time its mandate expires in 2008.172  Part of the 
problem is that these tribunals often have to pursue 
investigations and gather evidence and testimony from 
witnesses and places located thousands of miles from where the 
tribunals sit.  In any event, both the international community 
and leading international law publicists seem to be wary of the 
high costs of delivering justice through these tribunals.173  
Recent developments suggest that is unlikely that the 
international community will be willing to extend the 
jurisdiction of these tribunals to prosecuting rebel leaders who 
engage in provocative activity.  Indeed, escalating costs at the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have already prompted the United 
Nations Security Council to pass resolutions calling for those 
bodies to stop issuing new indictments and wrap up all 
operations by 2010.174  Finally, and more importantly, both the 
United States and China have still refused to accede to the 
Rome Treaty, which casts doubt on the ability of the 
international criminal court to carry out its current limited 
mandate effectively. 175  
                                                 
171 President of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
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December 5, 2005, addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2005/782 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at 
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/completionstrat/s-2005-782e.pdf.  
172 Id.  
173 See, e.g., Jose E Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: 
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999) (observing that 
enormous amount of money expended on the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda would have been better spent developing better 
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174S.C. Res. 1534,  S/RES/1534 (March 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 
7, S/RES/1503 (August 28, 2003).  
175 See  Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal 
Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (2003); John R. Bolton, The Risks and 
Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America’s 
perspective, 64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 167 (2001); Michael 
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Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of 
Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in 
Rome, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20 (1998).  Jenia Iontcheva has also argued that 
the lack of support for the ICC from key players such as the United States 
suggests that a less centralized approach to criminal enforcement might be 
appropriate.  See Jenia Iontcheva, Nationalizing International Criminal 
Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2005).  Posner and Yoo have argued that United 
States withdrawal from the ICC reflects the unwillingness of the United 
States to be subject to an entity it could not control.  See Eric A. Posner & 
John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 67-70 (2005).  For a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. approach 
to the ICC negotiations during the Clinton Administration, see David J. 
Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47 (2002). 
 
 
 
 
